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CHAPTER I   INTRODUCTION 
 
 ‘Until recently, QVC's only real rival was Home Shopping Network (HSN), which had 
revenues of $1 billion in 1993. A year ago QVC-in what looked like an attempt to create 
a fifth big American TV network-tried to buy HSN .……… the deal was abandoned 
when QVC set its sights on Paramount instead. Other, fresher rivals, such as 
ValueVision, Catalog 1 and TSM, are now crowding in.’ The Economist (Jul 9, 1994) 
 
Temporally separated merger decisions within an industry may not necessarily be 
independent events.  The literature on merger waves and casual observation attests to this 
fact. Fundamental economic shocks and cheaper capital are attributed as causes of this 
cascading effect in merger activity. See Harford (2004). Devoid of economic shocks will 
merger attempts by one firm encourage other firms to pursue similar strategies?  Further, 
do firms anticipate rival reactions in making their own merger decisions? This study aims 
to advance the continuing debate on the incentives to merge and the resulting impact on 
firm values within the strategic paradigm of merger related decision making. In 
oligopolistic settings, the incentives to merge may depend on the strategic variable firms 
choose to compete with, quantity or price. Stigler (1950) finds that, in the absence of 
merger related efficiencies, mergers may generally be unprofitable compared to the 
alternative of being an outsider (non-merging firm).  This result derives from the fact that 
the merged firm would exercise its increased market power and reduce output to a level 
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that is typically lower than the total output of the stand alone firms and thus providing the 
non-merging rival firms with an incentive to free ride and increase their own output and 
industry profits. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) re-examine the incentives to merge 
in a non-cooperative oligopolistic game setting with quantity competition and find that 
mergers are not profitable in a stigleresque sense. Others such as Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985) find that this result is reversed if price competition is assumed. A 
primary factor that is responsible for this reversal in the incentive to merge is the slope of 
the reaction functions, how firms react to pricing or quantity decisions of rival firms. In 
price competition, rival actions reinforce the price change induced by an initial merger. 
Whereas in quantity settings, rival actions are inversely related to outcome of the initial 
merger. This fundamental difference in the assumed framework of oligopolistic 
competition has been shown to moderate various firm level investment, financing and 
managerial compensation decisions.  
 
While the studies discussed above focus on single-merger analysis more recent 
research examine sequential merger decisions. The common theme amongst these studies 
is that incentives to merge may not only depend on the competitive structure of the 
industry but also on the expected impact of further consolidation in the industry. 
Examples of research in this direction include Caves (1991), Fauli-Oller (1995) and 
Gowrisankaran (1996). A general framework of sequential merger analysis is contained 
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in Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) who argue that ‘…a merger that is unprofitable in isolation 
maybe carried through if it encourages a subsequent merger that has a positive effect on 
the first group, or if it discourages one that has a negative such effect…..’. Sequential 
merger theories predict that sequential horizontal merger decisions would be interrelated 
and such mergers have implications on firm values and welfare. Despite theoretical 
speculation and media1  interest, empirical tests are limited. 
 
Recent research on merger waves revolves around the question of whether 
mergers are efficient reactions to industry-level or economy-wide shocks or information 
asymmetry driven or if they are merely speculative, that is the use of overvalued equity to 
make acquisitions. The ‘urge to merge’ could be independent of the motive to efficiently 
reallocate assets as a consequence of economic shocks. The evidence of heightened 
merger activity accompanied by high stock market valuations suggests alternative 
speculative motives. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that exogenous industry-wide 
                                                 
1
 An article in the Wall Street Journal (Jan 3, 1995) on heightened merger activity suggests that mergers 
serve as a mechanism to compete more aggressively in the product markets. The article quotes Allen 
Schwartz, head of investment banking for Bear, Stearns and Co. "A dominant theme [In mergers] in 1994 
was critical mass. Companies were trying to raise market share to be more competitive." Yet another article 
in the Wall Street Journal (Mar 10,2000) quotes Patrick Fallon, head of the technology banking group at 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc. "There's a ferocious land grab under way out there, everyone is trying to 
be the first mover in their niche of the market, and then consolidate it through acquisitions." Merger 
attempts by one firm may encourage other firms to pursue similar strategies. An article in The Economist 
(Jul 9, 1994) describing the multi-media merger of QVC and CBS states that, ‘Until recently, QVC's only 
real rival was Home Shopping Network (HSN), which had revenues of $1 billion in 1993. A year ago 
QVC-in what looked like an attempt to create a fifth big American TV network-tried to buy HSN .……… 
the deal was abandoned when QVC set its sights on Paramount instead. Other, fresher rivals, such as 
ValueVision, Catalog 1 and TSM, are now crowding in.’ 
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or economy-wide shocks can create the need to reallocate assets through mergers and 
find that the merger waves of the last century were highly correlated with economy wide 
re-allocation cycles. While the neoclassical ‘shock driven merger’ theory has substantial 
empirical support, alternative explanations of the clustering effect of mergers within 
industries as a consequence of stock market mis-valuation are contained in Shleifer and 
Vishny (2002) and Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005). Empirical tests of the valuation models’ 
predictions leads to the conclusion that while industry shocks may as well be the 
fundamental motivation to merge, mis-valuation affects how mergers are propagated 
through the economy. Harford (2004) pits the predictions of the neoclassical economic 
shock and the market valuation theories against each other and rejects the valuation based 
theories. He finds that the correlation between high market valuation and merger activity 
is only due to the fact that stock market values reflect the degree of capital availability. 
He concludes that economic shocks alone do not drive merger waves but shocks that 
coincide with the increased availability of capital to engage in reallocation drive them. 
These explanations are however void of the implications of strategic competition on 
sequential mergers between competing firms in an industry2. Whether it is profitable for 
the sequential adoption of mergers in an industry may depend on the nature of 
competition and the nature of externalities imposed by the mergers on rival firms. The 
                                                 
2
 Yan (2006) develops a theoretical model that incorporates product market competition into the standard 
Neo Classical framework to show that value-maximization need not be violated for there to be value-
destroying mergers. However, in his study he does not test if product market competition drives sequential 
merger decisions. 
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strategic value of being a first mover or of delaying the merger decision may cause 
mergers within an industry to be interrelated.  
 
The expected reaction of rival firms to a merger and the resulting impact on rival 
profitability due to a merger can be used to describe horizontal mergers as a sequential 
action-reaction game within an industry. Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), Fridolfsson and 
Stennek (2005) and others show that strategic motivations affect sequential merger 
decisions and have implications for market values and performance of merging firms. 
Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) cite Marc D. Granetz, Global Head of Mergers & 
Acquisitions at Credit Suisse First Boston, to motivate their theoretical framework of 
sequential horizontal mergers. Granetz noted that “Mergers and acquisitions activity has 
to a great extent involved change that became imperative for companies because another 
company acted first”.  
 
 The principal idea in this study is that in oligopolistic settings, a horizontal merger 
has spill-over effects on rivals and that firms trade off between merger-induced monopoly 
gains and losses against efficiency gains and losses in making merger decisions. When 
the spill-over gains to rival firms dominates efficiency gains from a merger, rival firms 
maybe less likely to pursue their own mergers. Firms take this expected reaction, also 
referred to as conjectural variation, of rival firms into account when making merger 
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decisions3. Therefore, given that a merger has occurred in an industry, the likelihood that 
the initial merger will be followed by a sequential merger is conditional on the nature of 
merger induced externalities and the expected reaction of rival firms. When merger 
induced externalities are positive, the likelihood of a sequential merger is lower. I refer to 
this expectation as the ‘Accommodation Hypothesis’.  
 
The primary objective of this study is to test the interrelatedness of sequential 
horizontal merger decisions described above. Strategic competition theory predicts that 
acquirers in violation of the accommodation principle should be penalized by the stock 
markets. Predictions related to acquirer returns are also tested in this study.  I develop a 
unique algorithm based on dormant time periods between mergers within 4-digit SIC 
industries to identify sequential and non-sequential (stand alone) horizontal mergers 
between 1980 and 2004. Following Eckbo (1983), Song and Walkling (2005), Shahrur 
(2004), Fee and Thomas (2004) and others I use the market reaction to rival firm’s stocks 
on announcement of a merger as a proxy for merger induced externalities. In addition I 
control for expected reactions of rivals using Sundaram, John and John’s (1996) 
competitive strategy measure, csm, which captures the nature of strategic interactions in 
an industry as the slope of the reaction function of rival firms. When this slope is positive 
firms are said to compete in strategic complements and when it is negative firms compete 
                                                 
3
 Conjectural Variation is a term used to describe the expected reaction of strategic players in single period 
product market games. 
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in strategic substitutes. Empirical proxies of strategic interactions in the product markets 
have been employed by Sundaram, John and John (1996), Kedia (2006) and Lyandres 
(2006) to analyze R&D investment, managerial compensation and capital structure 
decisions respectively. I use this measure in addition to traditional controls for market 
structure such as industry concentration indices. 
 
The findings in this study are partially consistent with the ‘Accommodation 
hypothesis’. Controlling for the type of competition in the product markets I find that the 
likelihood of sequential horizontal mergers is inversely related to the externality imposed 
on rival firms by an initial merger. I do not find evidence consistent with the stylized 
empirical results of Yan (2006), Carow, Heron and Saxton (2006) and others who find 
that early movers in merger waves are better off than late movers. The wealth effects for 
acquiring firms measured as their announcement period abnormal returns are not 
different between first and second stage acquisitions. These results for acquirer returns 
are not affected in multivariate settings and hence I conclude that overall the evidence is 
only partially consistent with strategic competition theory. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review 
of the literature and the development and statements of my specific hypotheses. Chapter 3 
discusses the sources of data and the research design employed in this study. Results of 
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my empirical tests are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 concludes with some 
remarks on the possible reasons for the weak evidence in favor of the predictions of 
strategic competition theory on sequential horizontal mergers.  
 9 
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
This study is related to at least two strains of the literature. Firstly, it contributes 
to the merger literature by testing the strategic motivations in horizontal mergers and its 
implication on the interpretation of merger related gains. Secondly, the role of strategic 
interactions in merger decisions is related to the growing body of literature on the 
relationship between product market competition and the outcomes of various corporate 
financial and investment decisions. I review the merger literature first and then discuss 
theories of strategic competition and finally I develop and present my testable 
hypotheses. 
 
2.1 The Theories and evidence on mergers 
The merger literature is vast and hence I restrict my survey to some of the 
important and recent results of merger studies. The research on mergers has primarily 
focused on the motivation to merge and the resulting impact on stockholder wealth and 
firm performance. I classify the extant literature under two broad categories, the 
traditional theories and the theories of merger waves, for expositional reasons only and 
not to imply that these theories are unrelated. 
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2.1.1 Traditional Merger Theories and Evidence 
  While the primary motivation to merge seems to be to exploit economies of scale 
or scope there is somewhat contradictory evidence that mergers maybe evidence of 
empire building behavior of managers. If mergers are truly motivated by synergistic gains 
then the market values of the merging firms should be positively impacted. An early 
survey of merger related gains in Jensen and Ruback (1983) concludes that mergers are in 
general wealth creating. While bidding firms on average make negative abnormal returns 
targets make positive returns and the combined firm returns are on an average slightly 
positive. More recent evidence contained in Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2002) 
confirms these results and show that they remain consistent even in mergers of the 
nineties. However the post merger market performance is found to be poor in many 
studies. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find evidence consistent with over extrapolation of 
past performance on the part of both the managers and investors in that high MB firms 
perform poorly in the three years following a merger. Early studies by Asquith (1983), 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that the 
stockholders of the acquiring firm experience negative long run returns while Franks, 
Harris and Titman (1991) do not find such negative performance. Similar evidence is 
found in studies on the post merger operating performance of bidding firms. On one 
hand, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) find that the post merger operating performance 
improves relative to an industry benchmark. On the other hand Ravenscraft and Scherer 
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(1989) find no such operating performance improvements. Barber and Lyon (1997), 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and others point out that methodological issues plague these 
long run event studies and therefore make these results unreliable. The first issue is the 
joint hypothesis problem that stock market efficiency and models of market equilibrium 
are jointly determined. The second issue pertains to the fact that mergers are not random 
events and tend to cluster in time which could lead to positive cross correlation of 
abnormal returns. The above evidence casts some doubt on the efficacy of the synergy 
based motivations of mergers.  
 
Roll (1986) proposed that managerial hubris and empire building tendencies may 
lead managers to make poor acquisitions as evidenced in the acquirer’s announcement 
returns and post merger performance. Jensen (1986) contends that due to agency 
problems managers of firms with excess free cash are prone to undertake value 
decreasing investments. These explanations moderately reconcile the anomalies in the 
empirical evidence on merger related gains. However, the finding that mergers in general 
can be wealth destroying raises important corporate governance concerns which have 
been addressed in various studies.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) study the role of 
governance in the mergers of the 80s and the 90s and conclude that the mergers of the 
80’s was primarily driven by the external governance mechanisms, i.e. the threat of a 
takeover, but in the 90’s the internal governance mechanisms such as the increase in 
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equity based managerial compensation and greater board involvement were responsible. 
Evidence of value destruction in mergers is contained in Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2001) who find that a few large firms are responsible for a majority of the losses 
made in acquisitions. They conclude that, while the evidence is consistent with the view 
of Jensen (2003) that high valuations give management more discretion to make poor 
acquisitions, it is not sufficient to explain the change in returns associated with 
acquisition announcements, as these firms have comparable valuations when they 
announce previous mergers or acquisitions that are associated with positive abnormal 
returns. While synergies, managerial hubris and agency problems may important drivers 
of mergers, the clustering of mergers within industries and the phenomenon of aggregate 
merger waves leaves some unanswered questions. 
 
2.1.2 Merger Wave Theories and Evidence 
Scherer (1980), in his analysis of the three great merger waves that occurred 
between 1887 and 1968, observes that while real economic motivations may drive 
mergers, speculative motives may be equally relevant. Exogenous industry-wide or 
economy-wide shocks can create the need to reallocate assets. Mergers may be an 
efficient response to such shocks and lead to a wave of mergers. However, during periods 
of high overvaluations in the stock markets, firms may find it profitable to use their 
overvalued stock as currency to buy other firms and this could also lead to the clustering 
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of merger activity during periods of high stock market overvaluations. The uncertainties 
regarding the motivations to merge leads to ambiguity in merger related policy making.  
Any merger among firms competing in the same market is a step, however large or small, 
toward increased concentration and may bestow abnormal market power on certain firms. 
The true motives to merge and the potential for monopolistic gains through mergers are 
hard to detect based on the effects achieved as the correlation between intent and 
outcomes may be far from perfect. The ongoing debate on the recent waves of mergers 
and the associated gains still revolve around the above mentioned issues. 
 
Recent empirical evidence on merger waves has revived the efficacy of economic 
motivations in mergers and shows that exogenous industry-wide or economy-wide shocks 
can create the need to reallocate assets. The process of reallocation may lead to new entry 
into the industry, mergers of less efficient firms with more efficient firms and the exit of 
inefficient firms. Hence the clustering of mergers within industries is interpreted as a 
simultaneous reaction to exogenous shocks. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that 
merger waves are highly correlated with economy wide re-allocation cycles and that exits 
precede merger waves.  Similar evidence can be found in Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2002) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) who find that regulatory, technological or other 
economic shocks precede merger waves.  
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While the neoclassical ‘shock driven merger’ theory has substantial empirical 
support, valuation based theory of mergers also explain why mergers could cluster within 
industries as a consequence of stock market mis-valuation. Informational inefficiencies of 
the stock market may cause firms to be either undervalued or overvalued with respect to 
their true values. Managers that recognize their overvaluation may use their stock as 
cheap currency to make acquisitions of firms who maybe relatively less overvalued. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) argue that despite the evidence of negative announcement 
returns to bidding firms, bidders may have made wealth maximizing decisions. They 
show that high stock market valuations along with uncertainty about true synergy values 
could encourage managers to buy less over-valued firms with stock. The overvaluation 
argument however suffers from the caveat that target shareholders might not accept such 
overvalued equity in payment unless the premium is so high so as to eliminate the 
acquirer’s gains. However during periods of economic turbulence that is accompanied by 
rapid upward trends in stock prices, the target shareholders, engendered by a mutuality of 
interest, can become myopic. Target managers with short horizons will be willing to 
accept over valued equity in payment. This could lead to a wave like phenomenon in 
mergers during periods of high overvaluation. Ang and Cheng (2003) find evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis and find that bidder returns, during high stock market 
valuations, corrected for market reversals exceed those of similarly valued non-merging 
matched firms. Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) develop a model of rational managerial 
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behavior and uncertainty about sources of mis-valuations which could cause market 
performance to be correlated with merger waves. They find evidence consistent with the 
models predictions and conclude that while industry shocks may as well be the 
fundamental motivation to merge mis-valuation affects how mergers are propagated 
through the economy. Harford (2004) pits the predictions of the neoclassical economic 
shock and the market valuation theories against each other and finds support for the 
neoclassical motivations. He finds that the role of market valuation in the tests was as a 
proxy for overall capital market liquidity. He concludes that economic shocks alone do 
not drive merger waves but shocks that coincide with the availability of capital to engage 
in reallocation drive them. All these theories are void of the implications of strategic 
interactions in merger decisions across time within industries. 
 
2.2 Strategic Competition and Mergers 
2.2.1 Background on the Strategic Competition literature 
The industrial organization literature has spawned a wide range of theoretical 
models that deal with strategic competition and its impact on firm decisions. The notion 
of strategic competition in sequential games in oligopolistic settings was simultaneously 
introduced by Bulow et al (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). As these authors 
have pointed out strategic competition can be used to understand many results in the 
oligopoly literature. An accessible exposition of strategic competition and its applications 
 16 
to business strategies is contained in Tirole (1988). The fundamental proposition of 
strategic competition theories is that a firm’s financial and investment decisions are 
influenced by the expected reaction of rival firms and is aimed at making product market 
competition less aggressive. 
 
Strategic competition and its role in corporate financial and investment decisions 
are explored in a number of studies. Brander and Lewis (1986) show that debt serves as a 
mechanism to pre-commit how a firm will compete in the product markets and that 
product market competition could in turn be an important determinant of capital 
structure. In a model of sequential choice of capital structure and output strategy they 
show that as firms increase their debt levels the managers would have greater incentives 
to pursue aggressive output strategies that would raise returns in the good states and 
lower returns in the bad states. Shareholders would ignore the low returns in the bankrupt 
states as debt holders would be the residual claimants. Firms may also adopt aggressive 
output strategy to force rival firms into bankruptcy. Empirical evidence of this type of 
relationship between financial structure and product market competition can be found in 
Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) who finds evidence consistent with the theory in the LBO era 
of eighties. The supermarket industry subject to active leveraged buyouts evidenced 
increased price levels as a result of aggressive output strategies in local markets. 
Lyandres (2006) examines the relationship between product market competition, capital 
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structure choice and aggressiveness of operating strategies and finds that a firm’s optimal 
leverage is related to the degree to which its operating strategy affects its rival’s value 
functions and resulting optimal output market choices. 
 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) develop 
theoretical models to show how managerial incentive contracts can be used to draw 
desired reactions from rival firms. Tilting the manager’s compensation away from profit 
maximization and towards sales maximization gives incentives to the manager to pursue 
an aggressive output strategy.  Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Kedia (2006) provide 
empirical evidence in support of the view that strategic interactions in the industry 
explain the lack of pay for relative performance and the use of stock based incentives in 
managerial contracts. They conclude that compensation contracts are designed to soften 
product market competition and hence place positive weight on both own firm and rival 
performance.  
 
Sundaram, John and John (1996) test the implications of the theories of strategic 
interactions in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Bulow et al (1984) in the market 
reactions to firm level R&D investments. They find that their measure of strategic 
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competition, whether industry competition is tough or accommodative4, explains the 
pattern of announcement returns to firms initiating new R&D spending and to their rivals. 
Using the competition measure developed in Sundaram et al (1996), Chen and Ho (1997), 
Chen, Ho, Ik and Lee (2002) and Chen, Ho and Ik ( 2005) test the implications of 
strategic competition theories on the market reactions to new product introductions and 
capital expenditures and find supporting evidence.  
 
More recently various studies have examined the role of intra industry dynamics 
in corporate decision making. Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that firm level real and 
financial decisions are inversely related to the same decisions made by other firms in the 
industry and more so in concentrated industries. Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2006) 
find that firm level investment and financing decisions are related to the extent that 
investment opportunities are interdependent within an industry. The above discussion 
suggests that the importance of strategic interactions in corporate financial and 
investment decisions cannot be understated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The definitions of tough and accommodative competition are based on the reaction by rival firms to a 
strategic initiative by one firm. If rivals react aggressively then competition is tough and less aggressive 
reactions would represent accommodative competition. 
 19 
2.2.2 Strategic Competition and Sequential Mergers 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that in the absence of ‘true’ synergies through 
mergers the incentive to increase output post merger is the same as it was pre merger. 
Therefore if efficiency gains are not merger specific a merger may not result in welfare of 
the consumers5. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) call this the No-Synergies Theorem. In 1997 
the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission revised its Horizontal Merger 
guidelines particularly in regards to efficiencies in mergers. These revisions were made to 
clarify the existing practices at the agencies regarding merger efficiencies. In an 
examination of the revision of the horizontal merger guidelines, Farrell and Shapiro 
(2000) discuss the impact of pre-merger competition on merger related welfare effects. 
They claim that conjectural variation6, how one firm expects other firms to react to its 
output decision is crucial in evaluating the efficiency and welfare gains associated with 
mergers. They contend that for a merger to induce welfare gains the merging firms must 
expect that output expansions will be matched not ignored or accommodated by 
competing firms.  
 
                                                 
5
 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) define ‘true’ synergies as those that can be attained only through a merger and 
that which cannot be achieved through the natural competitive process.  
6
 Conjectural Variation is a term used to describe the expected reaction of rival firms in single period 
models. However in this paper we will be concerned with expected reaction of rival firms in a two period 
model and the term strategic competition or strategic interaction will be used in this context and not 
conjectural variation. 
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The relationship between  pre-merger competition and the motives to merge and 
related welfare gains are considered in a number of different studies including Deneckere 
and Davidson (1985), Caves (1991), Fauli-Oller (1995), Gowrisankaran (1996), Spector 
(2001) Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) and others. Nilssen and Sorgard’s (1998) model 
provides a comprehensive treatment of how strategic competition, the expected reaction 
of rival firms, affect merger decisions and its policy implications. Nilssen and Sorgard 
(1998) extend the strategic competition taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to 
horizontal merger decisions and show how strategic considerations affect sequential 
mergers by competing firms7. The impact of a merger on the reaction of rival firms and 
the resulting impact on profitability are used to describe mergers as a sequential action-
reaction game within an industry. They derive two factors that affect the strategic motive 
to merge. The first factor is whether a merger encourages or discourages rival mergers. 
And the second factor is whether rival mergers increases or decreases own profit. Due to 
the strategic nature of the merger decision, firms may undertake unprofitable mergers or 
might pass up on profitable mergers in order to soften the reaction of rival firms. In a 
related paper Fridolffson and Stennek (2005) show that strategic motivations affect 
merger decisions and have implications for market values and performance of merging 
firms. If mergers tend to have negative externalities on non merging firms then it may be 
optimal to preempt rival mergers through own mergers even if they are unprofitable.            
                                                 
7
 The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of Nilssen and Sorgard’s (1998) Sequential Horizontal 
Mergers theory. 
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They use their framework to specifically resolve the empirical puzzle that while mergers 
raise current share values they reduce long term profitability. They also point out that 
long term profitability measures that control for common shocks by adjusting with rival 
firm performance may overlook externalities imposed by merging firms on non-merging 
firms and hence maybe biased.  
 
Other related studies that recognize preemption as a motive to merge include 
Toxvaerd (2003), Morellec and Zhdanov (2004), Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2004) and 
Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2006). Toxvaerd’s (2003) model of merger waves is 
based on a dynamic preemption game where acquirers compete for scarce targets. Value 
in delaying may result in the acquirer gaining from more favorable future market 
conditions at the risk of being preempted by rivals. Morellec and Zhdanov (2004) 
incorporate competition and imperfect information in the corporate control market and 
determine the terms and timing of takeovers by solving option exercise games between 
bidding and target shareholders. While Toxvaerd (2003) and Morellec and Zhdanov 
(2004) model the nature of competition in the corporate control markets the present study 
examines the role of product market competition and the incidence of mergers. Gorton, 
Kahl and Rosen (2004) argue that mergers and merger waves can occur when managers 
prefer that their firms remain independent rather than be acquired. If managers value 
private benefits of control sufficiently then a technological or regulatory change that 
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makes acquisitions profitable in some future states of the world can induce a preemptive 
wave of unprofitable, defensive acquisitions. Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2006) 
develop a real options framework to show that effect of mergers on equilibrium industry 
structure can explain abnormally high takeover intensity during periods of expansion and 
recession relative to intermediate states of the economy. While their model specifically 
addresses the issue of potential entry of new firms into the industry given the industry 
growth cycle, this study is aimed at testing the incentives to merge given potential rival 
mergers.  
 
Since strategic value of either being a first mover or of delaying the merger 
decision may cause mergers within an industry to be interrelated, the optimality of 
sequential adoption of mergers by many firms in the industry may depend on the severity 
of competition and the nature of externalities imposed by the mergers on rival firms. 
Evidence suggestive of the importance of strategic motives is scattered in the literature. 
Carow, Heron and Saxton (2004) test whether there are any benefits to early movers in 
merger waves and find that early movers earn superior returns than late movers. If these 
early movers were expecting subsequent mergers then they would have taken the 
resulting impact on profitability into account; even if the individual profitability of 
subsequent mergers are positive they should have no detrimental impact on the early 
movers. If such a detrimental impact were expected then the initial mergers will not be 
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undertaken. Such considerations can make the merger decisions in an industry to depend 
on the nature of strategic competition between firms.  
 
In an article titled ‘Too Fat to Dance’ in The Economist (May 31, 1997), the 
author cautions against the proposed merger of AT&T with SBC, which was itself 
formed as a merger of two Baby Bell firms, Southwestern Bell and PacTel.  
 
‘The new firm would be comfortably the biggest in America…….. It is worse than just 
big; it is also the wrong pairing. All the other proposed mergers that the regulators have 
approved joined companies that were not direct competitors; only the AT&T/SBC deal 
would cross this crucial boundary. The point of last year's telecoms law [The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 which relaxed the restriction of cross-holding across 
the cable and telephone companies] was to bring competition to local markets. That was 
supposed to come primarily from the giant long-distance companies and cable-TV firms, 
which had the necessary money and reach. AT&T, with $80 billion in annual revenues, is 
the biggest and as such should have been the Bells' worst enemy. If it instead marries two 
of the biggest Bells, it will eliminate the biggest potential competitor to them in their own 
markets………. But why let the two main combatants join the same side before the battle 
begins?’ 
 
 
While this outsider perspective raises important policy issues, the insiders’ 
perspective to the merger of the two firms is strategically optimal. Eliminating the 
competition in each others markets ensures that the ‘anticipated’ consolidation in the 
industry would be non-threatening if not beneficial to the merged firm. A Wall Street 
Journal article (1 Jul, 1997) on the same proposed merger of AT&T and SBC recalls a 
similar situation in 1993 when the proposed merger of cable giant TCI with Bell Atlantic 
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grabbed the headlines. John Malone, CEO of TCI, in defense of the proposed merger 
said, 
 
 “In [TCI’s] markets we will be offering telephony services against the incumbent 
telephone company, and they undoubtedly will retaliate by offering video services against 
us. And in the Bell Atlantic markets we’ll undoubtedly be offering video services against 
the incumbent operator, and they will undoubtedly align with other telephone companies 
to provide telephone service against Bell Atlantic”.  
 
In other words, the logic of the merger suggests that it would force others to 
respond. Eventually however, neither the AT&T/SBC merger nor the TCI/Bell Atlantic 
merger materialized. In fact, AT&T ended buying TCI and Bell Atlantic merged with 
NYNEX and later with GTE to form the former Verizon. 
 
If mergers are indeed interrelated within an industry then, failing to incorporate 
the sequential nature of mergers may lead to incorrect if not incomplete conclusions as to 
the impact on firm values. Song and Walkling (2003) find that market reactions at the 
time of an initial bid in an industry reveals information about potential bidders in the 
same industry. Additionally they find that the initial and subsequent bidder returns are 
similar in sign, proportion and magnitude. This evidence is suggestive of the 
interrelatedness of merger decisions. Announcement return studies that find negative 
returns on average to bidders conclude that mergers are wealth destroying to the bidder 
shareholders. But if bids are related across time then these studies may have overlooked 
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some crucial and more interesting insights in mergers. Preemptive or accommodative 
motivations can explain why firms might undertake seemingly unprofitable mergers. 
Akdogu (2003) studies the recent telecom merger wave and finds that mergers tend to 
have negative externalities on non-merging rival firms and cites this as evidence that 
unprofitable mergers may be undertaken to preempt rival mergers. It is also possible that 
mergers are undertaken to encourage rival mergers with positive externalities. If mergers 
impose externalities on other firms, then not only are announcement studies that fail to 
account for externalities misleading, but also the long term event study estimates 
controlling for common shocks using rival firm performance maybe biased. Therefore 
evaluation of the profitability of mergers needs to be conditioned on the externalities that 
mergers impose on other firms in the industry. While overvaluation or economic shocks 
may affect merger decisions, strategic interactions may have independent implications on 
how merger decisions are made and on merger related gains. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The objective of this study is to present and test the predictions of strategic 
competition theory as applied to horizontal mergers. The theory addresses two issues: 1) 
The likelihood of a sequential merger event and 2) The impact of strategic behavior on 
firm values. The influential factors in both issues are the nature of competition that 
prevails in the industry prior to the merger and merger induced externalities.  
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A horizontal merger in an oligopolistic market naturally results in decreased 
output for the merged firm. That is, the post merger output of the merged entity is lower 
than the sum of the stand alone pre-merger outputs of the acquirer and target firms. This 
result is fairly well established in the Industrial Organization literature, see Stigler (1950). 
In oligopolistic settings a merger bestows increased market power on the merged firm. 
This increase in market power, however small, results in a reduction of quantity and 
causes a marginal increase in industry price levels, which is enjoyed by the rival firms as 
well. In the absence of any efficiency gains and barring any legal restrictions a merger 
may be preferable only if rival firms follow suit and adhere to the increased (decreased) 
price (output) levels. Generally, rival strategies are symmetrical in price competition and 
asymmetrical in quantity competition. An important issue is whether mergers allow firms 
to commit to strategies to accommodate or to deter rival firms in the presence of 
efficiency gains. The resolution to this issue relies on the nature of merger induced 
externalities. In order to develop my hypotheses I first discuss how the type of strategic 
competition, price versus quantity competition, moderates merger decisions within an 
industry and then elaborate on the role of externalities in the merger game.  
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2.3.1 The role of strategic competition in sequential horizontal mergers 
In strategic complement industries, where the reaction functions have a positive 
slope, the underlying variable with which firms compete is price. Now consider a two 
stage decision process where two disjoint sets of firms, M1 and M2 respectively, make 
sequential merger decisions in such an industry. On the one hand, if a merger reduces the 
marginal cost of producing and thus lowers the merged firm’s price then this would 
trigger aggressive price competition in the product market and the first stage decision 
maker, M1, trades off the benefit of a merger with the costs of aggressive price 
competition that would follow the merger decision. If the net benefit outweighs the costs 
then the first stage decision (M1’s decision) should be to merge and be aggressive to 
deter rival firms. The second stage decision (M2’s decision) is now dependent on whether 
there are any efficiency gains to be sought through a merger so that it can be better off 
than in the no-merger situation. On the other hand, if the merged firm’s increased market 
power allows for an increase in prices then rival firms should stay put and benefit from 
the increased price level. 
 
In the case of strategic substitutes, where the reaction functions have a negative 
slope, the underlying variable is quantity or capacity. A merger may either provide output 
increasing technologies or output decreasing market power. If a merger provides output 
increasing technologies then this would trigger an output reducing action or a passive 
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reaction from the rival firms and hence M1 should be aggressive and merge. As in 
strategic complements, the second stage firm’s decision to merge is dependent on 
whether a merger would make it better off than in the no-merger situation. If the merger 
bestows enough market power to the first stage decision maker to cut back on output then 
this would result in an increase in output by rival firms which hurts the first stage 
decision maker and it will not merge.  
 
2.3.2 The role of externalities in sequential horizontal mergers 
The ‘Market power’ and the ‘Productive efficiency’ hypotheses are generally 
offered to explain the gains to merging firms and their rivals in horizontal mergers. 
Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) postulate that while the market power hypothesis8 
predicts positive externality on rival firms, the effect of efficiency motivated mergers is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, efficiency based mergers may signal a positive ‘in-play’ 
effect (prospective target effect) or opportunities for productivity increases through 
mergers. As Song and Walkling (2000, 2005) find this could lead to an upward revision 
in stock prices of rival firms in anticipation of subsequent rival mergers. On the other 
hand, a merger may lead to a gain in competitive advantage to the merging firms and 
result in negative externalities for rivals. See Akdogu (2005). As noted in Eckbo (1983) it 
is not possible to distinguish between the two hypotheses solely based on the market 
                                                 
8
 The market power hypothesis is essentially a collusion hypothesis, i.e. mergers result in anticompetitive 
output/prices.  
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reaction for rivals at the time of an initial merger. However, it is possible to form 
expectations about rival reactions to an initial merger under the two hypotheses as 
illustrated in Table 19. The optimal rival reaction to a merger under the market power 
hypothesis is accommodation. By being passive, rivals would gain from the monopoly 
rents accruing either from industry-wide collusion or through dominant firm pricing10. 
Under the efficiency hypothesis it is optimal for rivals to pursue own mergers as they 
may represent an efficient way to increase productivity or just to remain competitive11. 
Thus externalities could affect sequential horizontal merger decisions12 and externalities 
may in itself be an important driver of merger activity.  
 
{Insert Table 1here} 
 
.  Under the market power hypothesis the optimal reaction of rival firms should be 
to maintain the status quo and not pursue their own mergers. However, an initial merger 
may signal a competitive disadvantage and induce subsequent rival mergers. This 
discussion leads to my first empirical implication of the strategic competition theory on 
sequential merger decisions. 
                                                 
9
 This table has been adapted from Eckbo’s (1983) tests for collusion in mergers  
10
 Whether collusion is successful or not may depend on the nature of strategic interactions in the product 
markets.  
11
 Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2004) note that subsequent rival mergers may also result from 
information cascading effects developed in Bikchandani et al (1992). Rival firms, rightly or wrongly, could 
interpret a merger as a signal to pursue their own mergers. 
12
 In this study I use the terms mergers and acquisitions interchangeably 
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H1: If accommodation was intended then the likelihood of a sequential merger decision 
is negatively related to the externality imposed by early mergers on rival firms.  
 
While externalities have a direct impact on the subsequent rival firm decision this 
relationship maybe moderated by the nature of competition in the product market prior to 
the initial merger. When competition is in strategic complements (strategic substitutes) 
and there are positive (negative) externalities from the initial merger then the likelihood 
of further consolidation is increased.  This relationship is summarized in the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H2: The likelihood of a sequential merger decision is positively related to the interaction 
between the nature of competition and the externality imposed by early mergers on rival 
firms. 
 
The first two hypotheses jointly represent the accommodation hypothesis. The 
violation of the accommodation principle would imply value destroying actions with 
predictable effects on the stock market reactions to acquisition announcements.   
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Sundaram, John and John (1996) and Chen, Ho, Ik and Lee (2002) find that the 
announcement period returns to R&D and new product introductions, respectively, 
should be positive in strategic substitutes and could be negative or zero in strategic 
complements. The returns to acquirers in sequential mergers depends on strategic 
intention of M1, whether accommodation was intended or not. Therefore the theoretical 
expectation is one of a difference between announcement period returns of acquirers in 
M1 and M2 in each type of competitive structure. In strategic complement industries M1 
decides to merge only if the benefits from the merger itself outweigh the costs of 
aggressive price competition. While in strategic substitutes, the M1 decides to merge 
irregardless of efficiency or market power gains. Therefore I expect that in strategic 
complements early mergers fare better than the late movers while they are equally worse 
or better off in strategic substitute industries. 
 
H3: In Strategic Complements, the first stage acquirers are better off than the second 
stage acquirers. 
H4: In Strategic Substitutes, the first and second stage acquirers earn similar 
announcement period returns. 
 
Initial mergers with positive externalities should invoke a passive reaction from 
rival firms. This is the essence of the accommodation principle. When this status quo is 
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not maintained then the stock market should penalize the subsequent acquirers with lower 
announcement period returns. The following two hypotheses capture this expectation. 
 
H5: For mergers with a positive externality the announcement return to first stage 
acquirers are greater than that of the second stage acquirers. 
H6: For mergers with negative externality first and second stage acquirers earn similar 
announcement period returns. 
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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The objective of this study is to present and test the predictions of strategic 
competition theory as applied to horizontal mergers. In oligopolistic settings, the 
incentives to merge may depend on the strategic variable firms choose to compete with, 
quantity or price. Stigler (1950) finds that, in the absence of merger related efficiencies, 
mergers may generally be unprofitable compared to the alternative of being an outsider 
(non-merging firm).  This result derives from the fact that the merged firm would 
exercise its increased market power and reduce output to a level that is typically lower 
than the total output of the stand alone firms and thus providing the non-merging rival 
firms with an incentive to free ride and increase their own output and industry profits. 
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) re-examine the incentives to merge in a non-
cooperative oligopolistic game setting with quantity competition and find that mergers 
are not profitable in a stigleresque sense.  
 
Others such as Deneckere and Davidson (1985) find that this result is reversed if 
price competition is assumed. A primary factor that is responsible for this reversal in the 
incentive to merge is the slope of the reaction functions, how firms react to quantity or 
pricing decisions of rival firms. Horizontal mergers have spill-over effects on rivals and 
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firms trade off between merger-induced monopoly gains and losses against efficiency 
gains and losses in making merger decisions. When the spill-over gains to rival firms 
dominates efficiency gains from a merger, rival firms maybe less likely to pursue their 
own mergers. Firms take this expected reaction, also referred to as conjectural variation, 
of rival firms into account when making merger decisions. Therefore, given that a merger 
has occurred in an industry, the likelihood that the initial merger will be followed by a 
sequential merger is conditional on the nature of merger induced externalities and the 
expected reaction of rival firms.  
 
This section elaborates on the sources of data, sample selection criteria, my 
algorithm to identify sequential horizontal mergers and on my experimental design.  
 
3.1 Data  
The data for this study comes from three sources. The merger sample is from the 
Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC), the firm level 
data are from the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual financial data 
and the stock price data for announcement studies from the CRSP database.  The 
computation of a principal variable in this study that measures the competitive nature of 
the industry requires 10 consecutive time series data of firm level Net Income and Sales. 
For cases where there are gaps in the time series data I augment the COMPUSTAT data 
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with hand collected data either from the Moody’s Industrial Manuals or from the 
company’s SEC 10-K filings. 
 
3.1.1 The merger sample 
 I extract data on mergers from SDC between 1980 and 2004 using the following 
criteria  
1. Only mergers between firms in the same 4-digit Primary SIC code13,14 as reported 
on COMPUSTAT are included.  
2. Deal value as reported on SDC is greater than $50 Million 
3. The acquirer did not own more than 50% of target’s stock prior to merger 
announcement. 
4. Only those transactions that SDC describes as an acquisition of a majority equity 
interest in the target firm are included. 
5. Acquirers and Targets are publicly traded companies  
6. Financial  and Public Utility firms are excluded (SIC 6000-6999 and 4900-4999) 
7. Only completed transactions as reported on SDC are included. 
 
                                                 
13
 The literature is unclear as to what constitutes a horizontal merger. Some studies use the 4-digit SIC 
classification while others use the 2-digit or the Fama-French industry classification to identify horizontal 
mergers. Kahle and Walkling (1996) find that the COMPUSTAT and CRSP industry classification leads to 
substantial disagreement in identifying horizontal mergers. I note however that, CRSP 4-Digit SIC matches 
70% of my sample that is based on COMPUSTAT 4-Digit SIC based matching while SDC 4-Digit SIC 
based matching results in less than 30%.  
14
 The 4 digit SIC code used in this study to match acquirer and target industries are those reported as the 
most recent SIC code and not the historical SIC codes. Compustat reports the historical primary SIC code 
only from 1987 onward.  
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This results in 792 horizontal merger announcements whose distribution across the 
sample period in 4-Digit SIC industries is illustrated in Figure 1.  I note that horizontal 
mergers in my sample are in general more concentrated in the 1990s than in the 1980s 
time period. Table 2 provides the distribution of mergers across the sample period as 
well. Mergers prior to 1990 represent approximately 15% of the total number mergers in 
this sample. This is consistent with Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2004) who also 
report a sharp increase in the number horizontal mergers in the 1990s. The distribution of 
mergers across industries is also consistent with the merger wave literature that aggregate 
merger waves are caused by clustering of mergers in a few industries. But the number of 
industries represented in the late 1990’s is larger than the number industries in the 
1980’s. As reported in Table 2, I note that the top 6 industries, based on number of 
mergers (nofacqs), represent almost 35% of my merger sample. There are two industries 
that represent a major proportion of the total sample of mergers. The prepackaged 
software (SIC 7372) and the Oil and Gas (SIC 1311) industries represent approximately 
20% of the total merger sample. Pharmaceuticals (SIC 2834), Telecommunications 4813 
Computer Programming (SIC 7370) and the Semiconductor (SIC 3674) industries 
account for roughly 15% of the total sample.  
 
{Insert Figure 1here} 
{Insert Table 2here} 
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3.1.2 Identification of Sequential and Non-Sequential Mergers 
 In order to test the hypothesis that merger induced externalities may encourage or 
discourage further consolidation in the industry it is necessary to identify industries 
where mergers appeared to occur in sequence and where there were only stand alone 
mergers. The merger wave literature has developed various methods to rank merger 
activity on the basis of relative intensity of merger activity within industries and at the 
aggregate level and to identify the peak and troughs in merger activity. However, these 
methods do not directly address the empirical needs of this study. Therefore I develop my 
own algorithm whose purpose is to identify mergers that occur in isolation and mergers 
that occur sequentially. Amongst the mergers that occur sequentially it is necessary to 
further classify the mergers as early or first stage mergers and late or second stage 
movers.  
 
For each 4-digit SIC industry I estimate the dormant time periods between merger 
bids across the entire sample period. If a bid occurs after at least a year (360 calendar 
days) has lapsed with no bids in an industry, I classify the bid as an ‘initial bid’15. See 
Figure 2. All bids that occur within 120 calendar days following the initial bid along with 
the initial bid are classified as the first stage bidders. The choice of the 120-day criterion 
is based on the average time to completion of mergers from the announcement date for 
the sample of mergers used in this study. This criterion allows me to group firms that 
                                                 
15
 This method of identifying initial bids   is used by Song and Walkling (2005) to test their Bidder 
Anticipation Hypothesis. 
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choose to merge within a short window of time as the first stage decision makers. All 
bids that occur between 121 and 720 calendar days from the initial bid are classified as 
the second stage bidders. Bids that occur after 720 calendar days from the initial bid (t=0) 
but before the next initial bidder are excluded from the sample. The duration of a 
sequential merger decision is thus approximately two years. The choice to end the time 
line 720 calendar days from an initial bid is based on the stylized observation in the 
merger wave literature that the typical merger wave peaks within two year clusters. See 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Carow, Heron and Saxton (2006) and Harford (2004). 
 
The purpose of this algorithm is to identify mergers that occur in isolation and 
mergers that occur sequentially. Amongst the mergers that occur sequentially it is 
necessary to further classify the mergers as early mergers and late movers. If actual firm 
behavior is not consistent with these approximations then I could have misclassified the 
mergers. I note that other researchers conducting a similar study may use a different 
procedure to identify sequential mergers. However, I am unaware of any existing study 
that formalizes an algorithm to identify and classify sequential mergers. The procedure 
developed here is consistently applied, objective and replicable.  
 
{ Insert Figure 2 here} 
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I identify 195 initial bids using the above algorithm whose distribution across the 
sample period is presented in Table 2. Consistent with the distribution of mergers in 
Figure 1 the distribution of initial bidders is more concentrated in the late 1990s.  
 
Due to the nature of the algorithm some industries that are in the original sample 
of mergers have no identifiable initial bidders and hence are not represented in my final 
sample. To illustrate this point I use the example of the Computer Programming industry 
(SIC 7372) which represents about 4% of the total sample but did not have any 
identifiable initial bidders. The acquisition activity in this industry spanned between 1999 
and 2003 and the maximum dormant time period between mergers was 245 days. Based 
on the algorithm at least 360 days has to have lapsed without an acquisition bid in the 
industry for a bid to qualify to become an initial bidder. The first acquisition in this 
industry during my sample period occurred on January 19th, 1999 and all the acquisitions 
that ensued occurred within 360 days of each other. Additionally some industries where 
there were frequent acquisitions and for which there were multiple initial bidders are not 
necessarily fully represented in the final sample due to the fact that some acquisitions 
occur beyond the 720 day cut off point with no additional initial bids. Consider the Oil 
and Gas industry (SIC 1311) that had a total of 46 acquisitions with 6 initial bidders 
whose distribution is spread evenly throughout my sample period. This industry had 
acquisitions that occurred in 17 out of the 24 years in my sample. To illustrate the effect 
of the 720 day cut off from the initial bid consider the initial bid identified for this 
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industry that occurred on the 7th of April, 1997. Following this initial bid there were 33 
acquisitions that ensued without another identifiable initial bid till the end of my sample 
period in 2004. The mergers that are retained in my final sample is the initial bid itself 
along with 11 acquisitions that followed until the 13th of January of 1999. All the 
remaining 22 acquisitions that occurred after this point are eliminated from the sample as 
they are not classifiable into my first or second stage acquirer definitions.  
 
  Accounting for such eliminations I retain a final sample of 121 initial bids, 
reported in Table 3, for whom all required data for the computation of the measures 
described in the following section are available through the COMPUSTAT database16. 35 
of the 121 initial bids are followed by sequential mergers and the remaining 86 are non-
sequential or stand alone mergers. There are a total of 234 mergers in my final sample of 
all horizontal mergers including the first stage and the second stage bidders. This sample 
represents roughly 30% of the all the horizontal mergers extracted from SDC as 
described in the previous sub-section. 
 
                                                 
16
 The computation of a principal variable in this study, csm, which measures the competitive nature of the 
industry, requires 10 consecutive time series data of firm level Net Income (Data 172) and Sales (Data 12) 
and industry level Sales. In 108 cases out of the 195 initial bids complete time series data are not available. 
Relaxing the 10 consecutive time series data requirement to at least seven consecutive data points allows 
me to repopulate 21 missing csm values. For initial bids that are missing data in the middle of the time 
series I either fill in the gaps with hand collected data or by substituting in with the industry average csm. 
The hand collected data come either from the Moody’s Industrial Manuals or directly from the company’s 
SEC filings. Thus I have a final sample of 121 Initial Bids that span a total of 234 mergers across my 
sample period. 
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Each initial bidder is matched with a set of industry rivals in the same 4-digit 
industry. This procedure allows estimation of event period abnormal returns to a portfolio 
of rival firms at the time of the announcement of the initial bid. The empirical tests that 
are discussed below use these announcement effects as a proxy for merger induced 
externalities. There is an average of 34 rival firms (median=32, min=2, max=170) in each 
initial bidder industry excluding the acquirer and the target firm engaged in the initial bid.  
 
3.2 Experimental Design and Variable Construction  
3.2.1 Experimental Design for testing H1 and H2 
The objective of this study is to test the predictions of strategic competition theory 
as applied to horizontal mergers. Horizontal mergers have spill-over effects on rivals and 
firms trade off between merger-induced monopoly gains and losses against efficiency 
gains and losses in making merger decisions. When the spill-over gains to rival firms 
dominates efficiency gains from a merger, rival firms maybe less likely to pursue their 
own mergers. Firms take this expected reaction, also referred to as conjectural variation, 
of rival firms into account when making merger decisions. Therefore, given that a merger 
has occurred in an industry, the likelihood that the initial merger will be followed by a 
sequential merger is conditional on the nature of merger induced externalities and the 
expected reaction of rival firms. The two principal hypotheses in this study are as 
follows: 
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H1: If accommodation was intended then the likelihood of a sequential merger decision 
is negatively related to the externality imposed by early mergers on rival firms.  
H2: The likelihood of a sequential merger decision is positively related to the interaction 
between the nature of competition and the externality imposed by early mergers on rival 
firms. 
These two hypotheses together comprise my ‘Accommodation Hypothesis’. The 
impact on rival firms at the time of an initial bid is positive when there are market power 
gains that spill over to the rest of the industry. Such mergers should be met passively by 
rival firms if accommodation was indeed intended. Therefore the likelihood of a 
sequential merger in an industry is lower when rival firms experience a positive 
externality from an initial bid. The effect of externalities on sequential merger decisions 
is also moderated by the type of competition that prevails in the product markets. In 
industries that compete in strategic complements positive merger-related externalities 
increases the likelihood of a sequential merger. In order to test H1 and H2 I run event 
time industry level logistic regressions of the general form given in the following 
equation. 
 
Logit{P(Yit =1} =β 0 +β1Rivalposret_dummyt-1+β2 csmt − 1 +β3Rivalret*csmt − 1 +β4Zt − 1 (1) 
 
In the above equation, Yit, is the dependent variable which takes on the value of 1 
if an initial merger was followed by a second stage merger decision and a value of 0 if 
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there were no sequential mergers in an industry following an initial bid. I measure Yit, as a 
dummy variable equal to one when there is at least one merger in the second stage 
following an initial bid and equal to 0 otherwise.  This definition of the dependent 
variable maybe biased if the relative number of mergers across industries is different. 
Therefore I also measure the dependent variable as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
when the number of mergers in the second stage, nofm1, is greater than the average 
number of acquisitions, avgacqs, in the industry across the entire sample.  
 
The choice of a logistical regression to model sequential merger decisions has 
some limitations as well. Measuring the dependent variable in the binary form may 
misrepresent the relative intensity of the merger activity in the second stage. For 
robustness I also measure the dependent variable as the merger intensity in the second 
stage, ratio of number of mergers in the second stage, nofm2, to the total number of 
mergers in an industry, nofacqs. This dependent variable is truncated from below at zero. 
The model under this alternative measure of the dependent variable is then estimated 
using a Tobit regression.  
 
 
On the right hand side of the equation the first independent variable, 
Rivalposret_dummy, is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the portfolio of 
rival firms made positive returns at the time of an initial bid and a value of 0 if the returns 
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were negative. As noted in Eckbo (1983) a horizontal merger alters the nature of 
competition in the merging firms’ industry either through changes in product or input 
prices and this will in turn cause a revision in valuation of rival firms. Therefore 
measures of the abnormal returns earned by rivals at the time of a merger act as a proxy 
for the merger induced externalities. The second independent variable, csm, is Sundaram, 
John and John’s (1996) measure of strategic competition. The third term, Rivalret*csm, is 
an interaction variable between the nature of externalities and the strategic competition 
variable.  
 
The impact on rival firms at the time of an initial bid is positive when there are 
market power gains that spill over to the rest of the industry. Such mergers should be met 
passively by rival firms if accommodation was indeed intended. The likelihood of a 
sequential merger in an industry is thus lower when rival firms experience a positive 
externality from an initial bid and therefore I expect that the coefficient of 
Rivalposret_dummyt-1 is less than zero, β1<0 (Hypothesis 1). The nature of competition in 
the product markets, whether firms compete in strategic complements or substitutes has 
an independent effect on the likelihood of a sequential merger. Theory predicts that firms 
that compete in strategic complements (substitutes) have symmetrical (asymmetrical) 
strategic actions and leads to my expectation that the coefficient of csm is greater than 
zero, β2 > 0. In industries that compete in strategic complements the inverse relationship 
between the merger-related externalities and the likelihood of a sequential merger is 
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weakened and hence I expect the coefficient on the interaction term is greater than zero, 
β3> 0 (Hypothesis 2).  It is possible that the weakening relationship between externalities 
and the likelihood of the merger decision in strategic complements would drive β3 to a 
value of 0 and not necessarily greater than zero. The measurement of the principal 
variables and the choice set of control variables, Zt − 1, are explained below. 
 
Competitive Strategy Measure  
Each initial bid identified by my algorithm is matched with financial data on 
COMPUSTAT. In order to control for the product market competition I use a measure of 
competition developed by Sundaram et al (1996). This measure requires 10 years of lag 
data in its computation. Sundaram, John and John (1996) distinguish firms as competing 
in strategic substitutes (competition in quantity) or complements (competition in prices) 
by estimating a Competitive Strategy Measure (csm), defined as the responsiveness of the 
change in a firm’s marginal profits relative to its own output, with respect to  a change in 
competitors output. Therefore, if the profit-function of firm i can be denoted as 
∏
i 
=∏ (xi, xj)                   (2) 
Where xi and xj are the strategic actions of firm i and its rival, firm j then csm is given by  
∏
i
ij =∂
2
∏(xi,xj)/∂xi∂xj            (3) 
In equation (3) the term on the right hand side represents the second cross partial 
derivative of firm i’s profit with respect to the change in firm j’s strategic action. If  ∏iij  < 
0 then firm i is said to compete in strategic substitutes and if ∏iij  > 0 then firm i is said to 
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compete in strategic complements. Sundaram et al estimate the csm as the coefficient of 
correlation between change in a firm’s profit margin (measured as Data12 (Net 
Income)/Data172 (Sales)) and change in the Sales of the competition (change in 
aggregate industry sales)17 using ten years of quarterly data.  
 
                             { }2,11 / SSCorrCSM ∆∆∆= ∏                (4) 
 
Equation (5) represents the time series correlation of the change in profit margin 
for one firm with the change in aggregate sales for the industry between two consecutive 
time periods. This coefficient of correlation is a direct proxy of the second derivative of 
profit with respect to own quantity and the competitors’ quantity as defined by Bulow, 
Geanokoplos and Kemplerer  (1984). I use the csm measure both as a continuous variable 
and as a dummy, csm_dum,  to classify firms as competing in strategic substitutes and 
complements. Table 2 shows the classification of each initial bid industry into strategic 
complements and substitutes18.  
                                                 
17
 I use annual data to estimate csm as the quarterly data requirement seriously limits my sample size. As 
noted in Kedia (2006) and Lyandres (2006) measuring csm using quarterly versus annual data does bias the 
csm estimates. 
 
18
 Lyandres (2006) points out Sundaram et al’s CSM measure maybe biased if there are common elements 
that affect all firms in an industry similarly. I use Lyandres’s (2006) Adjusted CSM measure as an 
alternative proxy and find that similar results are obtained. The Appendix contains a discussion of the 
difference in the Sundaram et al CSM measure and Lyandres’s adjusted CSM. A limitation in regards to  
Lyandres’s measure is that it does not allow for time variance in strategic interactions. This could pose a 
significant problem as, seen in Table 2 for certain industries (SIC 4813, 2834, 5311 etc.), the classification 
industries based on CSM changes across time. 
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Estimation of event period announcement returns to rivals 
Announcement period abnormal returns are estimated using the market model. 
Expected returns to a firm are estimated over a period of 100 days prior to a merger 
announcement and the abnormal return itself is computed as the difference between the 
return earned on announcement and the estimated expected return. I cumulate these 
differences over a 3-day (-1, +1) event window surrounding the announcement date of the 
merger. I estimate the abnormal return to firm i (ARit) as  
ARit = Rit-αi-βiRmt       (5) 
where Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t, Rit is the realized 
return to firm i on day t, and αi and βi are parameters estimated using the market 
regression model. I use an estimation period of 250 days starting on day -300 relative to 
the acquisition announcement date. A minimum of 100 daily returns is required failing 
which the firm is omitted from the sample. The announcement date is the date on which a 
bidder makes a public announcement regarding acquisition and is obtained from the SDC 
database. To estimate rival abnormal returns at the time of an initial bid, I follow past 
studies such as Eckbo (1983) and Song and Walkling (2005) and form equally weighted 
portfolios which controls for contemporaneous cross-correlation of returns. I also conduct 
nonparametric generalized sign tests to test the significance of the percentage of positive 
abnormal returns. 
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The announcement period abnormal returns of a portfolio of rivals at the time of 
an initial bid are used as a proxy for the externalities imposed on rival firms due to an 
initial bid. This proxy has been used by Eckbo (1983) and more recently by Shahrur 
(2004), Song and Walkling (2005) and Fee and Thomas (2004) to measure the marginal 
impact on rival firms due to a merger in the industry. The rationale behind this proxy is 
that a horizontal merger alters the nature of competition in the merging firms’ industry 
either through changes in product or input prices and in turn causes a revision in 
valuation of rival firms. Therefore measures of the abnormal returns earned by rivals at 
the time of a merger act as a proxy for the merger induced externalities. I define rival 
firms as all the firms in the same 4-digit SIC code reported on COMPUSTAT other than 
acquirer and target firm engaged in the initial bid. I use these announcement period 
returns to rival portfolios both as a continuous variable, Rivalret, and as a dummy 
variable Rivalposret_dummy, which takes on the value of 1 if the portfolio of rival firms 
made positive returns at the time of an initial bid and a value of 0 if the returns were 
negative19. 
 
In what follows I describe the various control variables used in the logit 
regression models. The choice of the control variables are based on the merger wave 
studies that model likelihood of industry level merger waves.  At least three fundamental 
                                                 
19
 Using the sign of the rival portfolio’s abnormal return to create the dummy may mis-represent the 
variation in these returns across different industries.  In un-tabulated results I find that Sign tests for the 
abnormal returns to rivals are consistent with the sign on the abnormal returns to rival portfolios in the 
announcement studies.  
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factors have been identified that affects the likelihood of merger waves. Firstly, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that exogenous industry-wide or economy-wide 
shocks can create the need to reallocate assets through mergers and find that the merger 
waves of the last century were highly correlated with economy wide re-allocation cycles. 
Secondly, the evidence of heightened merger activity accompanied by high stock market 
valuations suggests alternative speculative motives. The clustering effect in mergers 
within industries as a consequence of stock market mis-valuation is contained in Shleifer 
and Vishny (2002) and Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005). Thirdly, Harford (2004) finds that the 
correlation between high market valuation and merger activity is only due to the fact that 
stock market values reflect the degree of capital availability. He concludes that economic 
shocks alone do not drive merger waves but shocks that coincide with the increased 
availability of capital to engage in reallocation drive them.  
 
Demand and Profitability Shocks 
Exogenous industry shocks maybe important drivers of merger activity. Bernile, 
Lyandres and Zhdanov (2006) find that during expansionary and recessionary stages of 
an industry’s life cycle a firm’s decision to merge has no impact on the incentives for 
new entry into the industry. While in the intermediate stages mergers may increase the 
threat of new entry. Therefore they expect higher merger intensity on the two extremes of 
the industry life cycle. Consistent with their predictions, Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov 
(2006) find a U-Shaped relationship between merger intensity and industry growth rates 
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especially amongst horizontal mergers. Following Bernile, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2006) 
I use the industry median sales growth rate, Demand Shock, and its square, 
Demand_Shock _Sq , prior to an initial merger to control for this relationship in my logit 
models. Independent of these demand shock effects the incentive to merge may also be 
affected by shocks to the profitability of the industry in general. Therefore I also control 
for profitability shocks using the industry median absolute change in profit margin, 
Profitability Shock, (Data 172 (Net Income)/Data 12(Sales)). 
 
Market Valuation Effects 
The merger wave literature recognizes that valuation errors and uncertainty in the 
equity markets positively affect merger intensity and the likelihood of merger waves. See 
Harford (2005) and Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005). I include the industry median equity 
Market to Book ratio, mb, calculated as Data 25(Common Shares outstanding)*Data 
199(Fiscal Year Closing Stock Price) /Data 60(Book Value of Equity), and the industry 
year standard deviation of the Market to Book ratio, mb_sd, as additional controls in the 
logit models. 
 
Credit Availability 
Harford (2005) finds that credit availability, or the economy wide cost of capital 
affects the likelihood of a merger wave. I follow Harford (2005) who argues on the basis 
Lown et al.’s (2000) results that the rate spread between commercial and industrial loans 
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and the federal funds rate maybe used as a proxy for overall capital liquidity or ease of 
financing  in the economy. I use this spread between commercial and industrial loan and 
the federal funds rate, c&i_spread, as an inverse proxy for credit availability20.  
 
3.2.2 Experimental Design for testing H3, H4, H5 and H6 
The returns to acquirers in sequential mergers depend on strategic intention of the 
first stage decision maker, M1, that is whether accommodation was intended or not. Firm 
behavior in line with the predictions of strategic competition is consistent with firm level 
value maximization. If the accommodation principle is valid then acquirers in violation of 
the principle are expected to be negatively impacted.  Therefore the theoretical 
expectation is one of a difference between announcement period returns of acquirers in 
the first and second stage decision makers in each type of competitive structure. 
Additionally initial mergers with positive externalities should invoke a passive reaction 
from rival firms. This is the essence of the accommodation principle. When this status 
quo is not maintained then the stock market should penalize the subsequent acquirers 
with lower announcement period returns. For sake of convenience I restate hypotheses, 
H3 through H6 here. 
 
H3: In Strategic Complements, the first stage acquirers are better off than the second 
stage acquirers. 
                                                 
20
 I thank Jarrad Harford for providing this data 
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H4: In Strategic Substitutes, the first and second stage acquirers earn similar 
announcement period returns. 
H5: For mergers with a positive externality the announcement return to first stage 
acquirers are greater than that of the second stage acquirers. 
H6: For mergers with negative externality first and second stage acquirers earn similar 
announcement period returns. 
 
To test the above hypotheses I use a simple OLS regression model of acquirer 
returns of the general form represented in the following equation. 
 
Acq_retit = β 0 +β1Rivalposret_dummyt+β2CSMt − 1 +β3Stage1t − 1 +β4Xt − 1 + υt                        (6) 
 
The dependent variable, Acq_retit, is the 3-day (-1,+1) announcement period 
abnormal return to acquirers. On the right hand side, the independent variables include 
the principal variables, Rivalposret_dummyt and CSMt − 1, from the logit model explained 
above and a set of control variables, Xt − 1, explained below, that have been shown to 
affect acquirer returns. The third term on the right hand side, Stage1, is an indicator 
variable that identifies whether an acquirer belongs to the first stage. The stylized results 
in the merger wave literature are that early mergers in merger waves fare better than the 
late movers. See Yan (2006) and Carow, Heron and Saxton (2006). Therefore I expect 
that in general the coefficient on Stage1 is greater than zero, β3> 0. H3 and H4 imply 
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differential announcement period returns to the first stage and second stage bidders based 
on whether they compete in strategic complements or substitutes. In strategic 
complements the first stage mergers are better off than the second stage mergers. 
Therefore in the strategic complement sub-sample I expect that the coefficient on Stage1 
is greater than zero β3> 0 (Hypothesis 3) and that Stage1 does not have a significant 
effect on acquirer’s returns in the strategic substitute sub sample, that is β3=0 (Hypothesis 
4). Violation of the accommodation principle implies that second stage mergers, M2,  that 
occur in the sub-sample of initial bids with positive externalities are value destroying 
decisions and therefore I expect that β3> 0 (Hypothesis 5), that is first stage mergers, M1 
fare better than the second stage mergers, M2. If externalities are negative then I expect 
that β3 is not different from zero, β3=0 (Hypothesis 6), that is there is no difference in the 
announcement effects between the first stage, M1 and second stage mergers, M2. I 
discuss the construction of the independent variable and the set of control variables, Xit 
and the motivation behind choice of the control variables in what follows. 
 
Estimation of event period announcement returns 
Announcement period abnormal returns of initial bidders and all acquiring firms 
are estimated using the market model. Expected returns to a firm are estimated over a 
period of at least a 100 days prior to a merger announcement and the abnormal return 
itself is computed as the difference between the return earned on announcement and the 
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estimated expected return. I cumulate these differences over a 3-day (-1, +1) event 
window surrounding the announcement date of the merger. I estimate the abnormal return 
to firm i (ARit) as  
ARit = Rit-αi-βiRmt       (7) 
where Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t, Rit is the realized 
return to firm i on day t, and αi and βi are parameters estimated using the market 
regression model. I use an estimation period of 250 days starting on day -300 relative to 
the acquisition announcement date. A minimum of 100 daily returns is required failing 
which the firm is omitted from the sample. The announcement date is the date on which 
bidder makes a public announcement regarding acquisition and is obtained from the SDC 
database. As mentioned earlier, estimation of abnormal returns to rivals I follow past 
studies such as Eckbo (1983) and Song and Walkling (2005) and form equally weighted 
portfolios which controls for contemporaneous cross-correlation of returns. I also conduct 
nonparametric generalized sign tests to test the significance of the percentage of positive 
abnormal returns. 
 
Dormant time period prior to an acquisition bid 
Song and Walkling (2006) find that the announcement period abnormal returns 
are positively associated with a measure of time elapsed between the most recent merger 
in an industry and the merger in question. Song and Walkling (2006) contend that less 
anticipated mergers are received more favorably in the stock markets. I include a similar 
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measure, Dormant, that measure the difference in calendar days between the most recent 
merger in the industry and the merger in question. 
 
 
Initial Bidder dummy 
In the Acquirer Return OLS regression models I include an indicator variable, 
ib_dum, which identifies acquisitions made by initial bidders. I include this indicator 
variable in addition to controlling for anticipation effects of Song and Walkling (2006) as 
according to the principal prediction of sequential horizontal merger theory developed by  
Nilssen and Sorgard(1998), firms may engage in value destroying acquisitions if it results 
in rival mergers with positive externalities or if it discourages one with a negative such 
effect.  
 
Acquirer size and market valuation effects 
Moeller et al (2005) finds that large firms are more likely to undertake value 
destroying mergers and so I include a control of acquirer size, log assets, as the log of 
firm assets (Data6 Assets). In addition I also include the market to book ratio of equity, 
amb, as firms with overvalued equity are more likely to use stock to make acquisitions. 
Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) find that uncertainty in the stock market can lead to mis-
valuations which in turn could lead even rational managers to undertake value destroying 
acquisitions. Therefore I include the standard deviation of the equity market to book 
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ratio, mb_sd, amongst the firms in the industry prior to the merger to control for stock 
market mis-valuations. I also control for the relative size of acquirer to target using the 
ratio of the market to book ratios, mb_rel, of the acquirer and the target firm as Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) find that acquisitions of low Market to Book firms by high Market to 
Book firms positively fare better than if the acquisitions were made by low Market to 
Book firms.  
 
 
 
Market Concentration Index 
To control for industry concentration I use a sales based Herfindahl concentration 
index that is commonly used to measure market share concentration. I define the index as  
Hi  = ∑
=
N
i
iS
1
2
          (8) 
Where Hi is the index value for industry I and Si is the ratio of own firm sales to total 
industry sales (market share) in the same 4-digit SIC code. The Herfindahl index not only 
captures the impact of the number of firms in an industry but also their relative market 
shares on the degree of product substitutability. Industries in which smaller numbers of 
firms have disproportionately large market shares will exhibit greater product 
differentiation. Greater product differentiation would reduce the impact of a rival firms 
action on own firm’s marginal profitability and hence would be void of strategic 
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interactions. However this measure does not allow us to classify firms as competing in 
Strategic Substitutes and Complements but only allows us to identify the potential for 
strategic interactions. Aggarwal and Samwick (1998) use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
(HH) index contained in the Census of Manufactures where the index is computed as the 
sum of the squared shares of the industry’s total value of shipments for the largest 50 
firms. The HH index is available only for manufacturing industries in 5 year intervals. To 
overcome these limitations the measure of industry concentration here is based on the 
Sales data available on COMPUSTAT (Data 12 Sales). The sales based Herfindahl index 
is reported for each initial bidder industry in Table 3.  
 
{Insert Table 3here} 
 
Demand and Profitability Shocks 
Industries experiencing demand and/or profitability shocks are more likely to 
witness higher merger activity. See Harford (2004). I use the industry median sales 
growth rate (Demand Shock) the industry median absolute change in profit margin (Data 
172 (Net Income)/Data 12(Sales)) to control for firms experiencing demand or 
profitability shocks who may be more likely to gain from a merger. 
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Merger Characteristics 
In addition to the control variables listed above I also include merger specific 
characteristics. I use the log of deal value as a proxy for the deal size as it is found that 
larger acquisitions fare worse than smaller acquisitions. I use an indicator variable, 
tender_dum, to identify whether an acquisition bid was made through a tender offer. I 
also include dummies to identify whether a merger was challenged by the merger 
authorities as reported on SDC and if the merger was a cash-only deal to control for the 
method of payment.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter discusses the results of my empirical tests described in the previous 
chapter. The objective of this study is to present and test the predictions of strategic 
competition theory as applied to horizontal mergers. The two principal hypotheses in this 
study that comprise my ‘Accommodation Hypothesis’ are that the likelihood of a 
sequential merger in an industry is lower when rival firms experience a positive 
externality from an initial bid and that in industries that compete in strategic 
complements this inverse relationship between the merger-related externalities and the 
likelihood of a sequential merger is weakened.  
 
 4.1 Likelihood of Sequential Horizontal Mergers 
In order to test H1 and H2 I run event time industry level logistic regressions of 
the general form stated earlier in equation (1) which is reproduced below. 
 
Logit{P(Yit =1} =β 0 +β1Rivalposret_dummyt-1+β2 csmt − 1 +β3Rivalret*csmt − 1 +β4Zt − 1      (9) 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 present the summary statistics and the correlation 
coefficients of the dependent, the principal independent and the control variables, Zit  for 
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the 121 initial bids retained in my final sample. Panel A of Table 4 reports that the mean 
values of csm is negative indicating that the average industry in my sample compete in 
strategic substitutes. The industry average csm, indavgcsm, computed as the average csm 
on a industry year basis is also negative on an average. Also reported in Panel A is a 
measure of market share concentration, hhi, measured as the Herfindahl Index of Sales 
based market shares and the average hhi for the 121 initial bidders in my sample is about 
1670.  Panel B presents the merger characteristics. Comparing the mean values of 
cluster1 and cluster2 which measures the intensity of merger in the first and second stage 
respectively indicates that on an average merger intensity is higher in the first stage than 
in the second stage. There are on an average 10 acquisition bids, nofacqs, in an industry 
across my sample period. The impact of an initial bid on rival firms, Rivalret, is on an 
average 0.55% with a standard deviation of about 2.66%. Panel C describes the control 
variables set, Zit. Demand Shock and Profitability Shock, represent demand and 
profitability shocks in an industry measured as the industry median sales growth and 
industry median change in profit margins. The latter variable, Profitability Shock, is 
measured in absolute terms and the average median absolute spread between the profit 
margins in two consecutive time periods before an initial bid in the industry is about 8%. 
The former variable, Demand Shock measures shocks to industry demand as the median 
percentage change in Sales between two consecutive time periods prior to an initial bid. 
The average Demand Shock is close to a positive 10% which indicates that a typical 
industry with an initial bid experiences a positive demand shock. The average market to 
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book ratio, mb is 2.4 with a standard deviation of 3.14%. The spread between the 
Commercial & Industrial Loan rate and the federal funds rate, c&i_spread, is on average 
1.57%, with a low of .80% and a high of 2.51%.  
 
{Insert Table 4 and Table 5here} 
 
Table 5 presents the correlations between the dependent and the independent 
variables. As expected, csm and the indavgcsm are positively correlated and lognumfirms 
and HHI are negatively correlated. The dependent variable, m2, an indicator variable 
identifying sequential mergers is negatively correlated with cluster1 and positively with 
cluster2. While the positive correlation is a natural expectation as the number of mergers 
increases in an industry the occurrence of a sequential merger is more likely, the negative 
correlation between cluster1 and m2 is not readily explained. Cluster1 and Cluster2 do 
not have the predicted correlations with Demand Shock and Demand_Shock _Sq as 
theorized by Bernile et al (2006) that there should be u-shaped relationship between 
demand shocks and merger intensity. 
 
4.1.1 Do externalities affect sequential merger decisions? 
To test the accommodation hypotheses in H1 and H2 I run industry level event 
time regressions described in Equation (7) for each initial bid and these results are 
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reported in Table 6. The dependent variable, in columns 1,2 and 3, is a binary variable 
that takes on the value of 1 if there was at least one merger in the  second stage decision 
and 0 otherwise. In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 when the number of mergers in the second stage, nofm1, is greater than the average 
number of acquisitions, avgacqs, in the industry across the entire sample. In the last 
column, the dependent variable is measured as the merger intensity in the second stage, 
cluster2, ratio of number of mergers in the second stage (nofm2) to the total number of 
mergers in an industry (nofacqs). This dependent variable is truncated from below at 
zero. The model under this alternative measure of the dependent variable is then 
estimated using a Tobit regression.  
 
The primary independent variable is a dummy identifying merger related positive 
and negative externalities measured as the 3-day abnormal return earned by a portfolio of 
rival firms at the time of the initial bid. This measure is used as a proxy for the externality 
imposed by a merger on the rest of the industry. Other controls21 include an economic 
shock variable defined as the median percent change in the Profit margin in the industry 
prior to the initial bid, demand shock variables22 defined as industry median percentage 
change in sales and its square, the industry median market to book ratio, a proxy for 
                                                 
21
 The choice of the control variables in these logit regressions are motivated from merger wave studies 
reviewed in Chapter 2. 
22
 Bernile, Lyandres and Zhnadov(2006) find that the takeover intensity is especially high during high and 
low product market demand conditions leading to a U-shaped relationship between merger activity and 
demand shocks. 
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capital availability23 measured as the spread between the Commercial and Industrial loans 
rates and the federal funds rate and a measure of strategic competition described in the 
last section.  
 
{Insert Table 6 here} 
 
 
Two principal findings emerge from these results. Firstly, the externality dummy 
is consistently inversely related to the likelihood of a sequential merger decision in all the 
variations of the original model. This result is consistent with the accommodation 
hypothesis, H1 that rival firms would choose to passively react to mergers that may 
increase the monopoly rents to all incumbent firms in the industry. Secondly, there is 
moderate support that the likelihood of a sequential merger is negatively related to capital 
availability proxy. This result is consistent with the merger wave literature in that the 
economy wide cost of capital moderates the timing of merger activity. H2 predicts that 
the coefficient on the interaction term, Rivalret*csm, should be positive. I find that this 
variable is not statistically significant in any of the models. As mentioned earlier this 
insignificance does not necessarily imply inconsistency with the strategic competition 
theory as the weakening effect of externalities on the likelihood of sequential mergers 
may simply drive β3 to a value of zero. To verify the robustness of these results I examine 
                                                 
23
 I thank Jarrad Harford for providing this data 
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the impact of externalities in sub-samples that are classified on the basis of their market 
structure in the following section. 
 
 
4.1.2 Does Pre-Merger Industry Competition Matter? 
As hypothesized earlier in the paper the likelihood of sequential adoption of 
mergers in an industry maybe moderated by the pre-merger industry market structure. 
However neither the strategic interactions variable nor the interaction term between 
externalities and strategic competition has a significant effect on the likelihood of 
sequential mergers in Table 6. In order to verify the robustness of this relationship I 
parse the initial bidders based on their csm values and re-run the logit model. I separate 
the strategic complement industries from the strategic substitute industries. The results 
from these regressions are reported in Table 7. In columns 1 and 2, I measure 
externalities as dummy variable, Rivalposret_dummy that is equal to 1 if the rival 
portfolio abnormal returns are positive and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 4 I measure 
externalities as a continuous variable, which is the actual abnormal return to rival 
portfolios. The externality proxy is no longer consistently negatively related to the 
likelihood of sequential mergers. Overall, based on the results in Table 6 and Table 7 I 
conclude that I find moderate support for H1 and no evidence consistent with H2.  
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{Insert Table 7here} 
 
 
 
4.2 Announcement Returns to Acquirers and Rivals 
This section presents the tests of hypothesis H3, H4, H5 and H6. The returns to 
acquirers in sequential mergers depends on strategic intention of M1, whether 
accommodation was intended or not. If the accommodation principle is valid then 
mergers by firms in violation of the principle are expected to be negatively impacted.  
Therefore the theoretical expectation is one of a difference between announcement period 
returns of acquirers in M1 and M2 in each type of competitive structure. Additionally 
initial mergers with positive externalities should invoke a passive reaction from rival 
firms. This is the essence of the accommodation principle. When this status quo is not 
maintained then the stock market should penalize the subsequent acquirers with lower 
announcement period returns.  
 
I first present and interpret the univariate evidence from event studies in the 
following sub-section and then conduct multivariate tests in the form of OLS regressions 
of acquirer returns. 
 
4.2.1Univariate Evidence from Event Studies 
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I conduct event period announcement studies for the acquirers and rivals in my 
sample and for sub-sample classifications based on whether the acquirer was a first stage 
acquirer, the nature of industry competition and the nature of externalities imposed by 
early mergers on rival firms. These results are presented in Table 8. 
 
4.2.2 Testing Hypothesis H3 and H4 
Table 8 reports the announcement period abnormal returns of acquiring firms 
and their rivals. I use the market model to estimate the expected returns over a period of 
100 days prior to a merger announcement. The abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between the return earned on announcement and the expected return. I 
cumulate these differences over a 3-day and a 2-day event window.  
 
Panel A of Table 8reports the acquirer’s announcement returns which are on 
average negative (-2.18%) and consistent with past literature which reports zero or small 
negative returns to acquirers. The average return to the initial bidders is negative (-
2.38%) also. This result differs from the evidence in Song and Walkling (2005) who find 
that the initial bidders in their sample earn positive abnormal returns on announcement24. 
I note two possible reasons why this difference may arise. Firstly, Song and Walkling’s 
tests include both vertical and horizontal mergers. And secondly, their sample includes 
                                                 
24
 In un-tabulated results I replicate Song and Walkling’s method and find that for a sample of 416 Initial 
bidders the abnormal announcement return is on average positive to the tune of 0 .74% which is significant 
at the 1% level. 
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acquisition of private targets. Panel B reports the announcement returns to the first stage 
and second stage mergers and the associated abnormal returns to rival firms. In general 
the first stage mergers are not received with more favorable stock market reactions at the 
time of announcement than the second stage mergers. Column (3) of Table 3 presents the 
P-value for a single tailed difference in mean t-test between the two groups, M1 and M2. 
The result here suggests that in general the first stage acquirers are not better off than the 
second stage acquirers.   
 
{Insert Table 8 here} 
 
 
I find that the rival firms of the first stage acquirers make an average of 0.45% 
while the rival firms of the second stage acquirers make a small negative return, (-
0.04)%. The pattern of positive announcement returns to rival firms is similar to those 
reported in Shahrur (2006) and Fee and Thomas (2006) who find that the average returns 
to rival firms is positive. The interesting result however is that the positive returns to 
rivals are reversed at the time of the second stage decision to merge. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that mergers that violate the principle of accommodation are 
detrimental to industry incumbents lending additional support to H1.  
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Panels C and D classify the acquiring firm’s industries into those that compete in 
strategic complements and strategic substitutes respectively. According to H3 first stage 
acquirers in strategic complements should be better off than the second stage acquirers 
and the returns should be indistinguishable between the two groups in strategic 
substitutes. Column 4 of Panel C reports the p-value for the difference in mean t-test 
between the first stage acquirers and the second stage acquirers. This difference is not 
statistically significant. Similar results are reported for strategic substitutes in column 4 
of Panel D. These results while inconsistent with H3 are consistent with H4. Overall the 
returns to acquirers under the two competitive regimes show that both first stage and 
second stage acquirers equally bad. 
 
 
4.2.2 Testing Hypotheses H5 and H6 
According to H5 and H6 the first stage and second stage acquirer’s returns should 
be different depending on whether the externalities imposed on rival firms by early 
mergers are positive or negative. Panels E and F of Table 8 report the announcement 
returns to the two groups classified into mergers with a positive or negative externality. 
For initial bids with positive externalities, the first stage acquirers fare better than the 
second stage acquirers as indicated by a P-value of .09 for the difference in mean t-test 
between the two groups. This difference is not statistically different for initial bids with 
negative externalities.  This result not only lends support for H5 and H6 but also further 
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solidifies the accommodation hypothesis, H1 that when the accommodation principle is 
violated the market penalizes the late movers.  
 
4.2.3 Multivariate Evidence from OLS regressions  
While the univariate evidence on acquirer returns is partially consistent with the 
predictions of strategic competition on sequential mergers, definite conclusions cannot be 
drawn unless the univariate effects persist in a multivariate setting. To test hypotheses H3 
through H6 I use a simple OLS regression model of acquirer returns of the general form 
in Equation (2) that is reproduced below. 
 
Acq_retit = β 0 +β1Rivalposret_dummyt+β2CSMt − 1 +β3Stage1t − 1 +β4Xt − 1 + υt                        (10) 
 
Table 9 and Table 10 present the summary statistics and the correlation coefficients of 
the dependent and independent variables. Panel A of Table 9restates the findings in 
Table 8 that acquirer returns are negative on an average while the rival returns are 
generally positive. Panel B reports the average values of the csm variables and also that 
on an average there are about two mergers in the first and the second stage following an 
initial bid. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the control variables set, Xit. It 
should be noted that the acquirer regression models have lower sample size that total 
number of acquisitions represented by the 121 initial bids in my sample. Particularly the 
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requirement of the relative market to book ratio, mb_rel,  and merger characteristics such 
as the method of payment, meth_pmt, whether the acquisition bid was challenged, 
challenged, or even the deal value, deal_val, imposes some loss in data points. In order to 
account for this differential sample size and its effect on the regression estimates I report 
two sets of regression models for a complete sample and a sub-sample in Table 11 and 
Table 12 respectively. 
 
Table 10 reports the correlations and cross correlations between the dependent 
and independent variables. None of the correlations seem to indicate any serious multi-
collinearity issues in my OLS regressions. 
 
{ Insert Table 9and Table 10 here } 
 
Table 1125 reports OLS regression results of announcement returns to acquiring 
firms controlling for various factors that were discussed in the previous chapter. The full 
models are estimated in columns 1 and 2. Acquirers are separated into sub samples based 
                                                 
25
 In the regressions estimated in Table 11 and Table 12 there could be some concern with the model 
specification particularly with respect to the announcement returns to the initial bidders and the externality 
measure which are calculated contemporaneously and could lead to biased coefficient estimates. To allay 
this concern I also run the regression model excluding the initial bidders and find that the coefficient 
estimates are qualitatively similar. These results are reported in the Appendix. 
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on the sign of their csm and on the sign of the announcement return to rival portfolios at 
the time of the initial bid, Rivalret in columns 3,4 and 5,6 respectively.  
 
{Insert Table 11here} 
 
The principal variable of interest is Stage1, which is a dummy variable that 
identifies first stage bidders including the initial bidder. In general this variable is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the acquirer returns. This positive 
relationship is expected to be primarily driven by acquirers in strategic complements (H3 
and H4) and those that experienced positive externalities (H5 and H6). Because 
hypotheses 3 through 6 imply differential effects between sub-groups I have also reported 
the F-Statistic, at the bottom of Table 11, produced by the interaction terms between 
Stage1 and competition measure and Stage1 and the externality proxy. This statistic is 
constructed under the estimation of the full model. These F-stats fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that Stage1 has differential effect between the subgroups based on the 
competitive strategy measure and the externality measure26. Overall, the coefficient on 
Stage1 is insignificant in all specifications of the model lending no support to hypotheses 
3 through 6. Despite the fact that the majority of the variables, except for the market to 
book ratio of the acquiring firm and the market concentration index, are statistically 
                                                 
26
 The Appendix contains a further discussion of this issue. In addition I report a variation of the model 
reported in Table 11 to test for the differential impact of Stage1 between the subsamples. 
 72 
insignificant the over model fit is good as indicated by the F-Stats reported at the bottom 
of the table along with the sample sizes and the R-Squared values27.  
 
{Insert Table 12here} 
 
While the acquirer return regressions in Table 11provides no support for my 
predictions it is possible that the regression models are incomplete without controlling for 
merger specific characteristics. To ensure robustness of these results I report the acquirer 
return OLS regressions in Table 12 including additional variables but for a smaller 
sample. These models perform worse than those presented in Table 11. While the 
coefficient on Stage1 remains insignificant the effects of acquirer market to book and 
market concentration continue to persist. Overall these multivariate results lend little or 
no support to validate the theoretical expectation that violation of the accommodation 
principle has any market value consequences.  
 
                                                 
27
 Some of the adjusted R-squared values reported in Table 11and Table 12 are negative. This is possible 
whenever the model contains predictors that do not add sufficiently to the model.  The penalty becomes 
larger in the adjusted R-squared calculation for such models. It is possible for the adjusted R-squared to 
decrease with the addition of predictor variables, even if the R-squared increases slightly. 
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CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 
 
This study is unique in its approach to the analysis of horizontal mergers. While 
the extant empirical literature examines cross sections of merger events or on the 
clustering effect in mergers, this study introduces a different perspective on merger 
decisions. Horizontal mergers, viewed as sequential events in an industry, allow for 
competitive dynamics with predictable effects on market values of merging and non 
merging rival firms. Merger decisions across time could be interdependent as merger 
induced externalities may encourage or deter subsequent rival mergers. Mergers that 
increase monopoly rents to rivals may induce an accommodative rival reaction whereas 
mergers that signal productivity increases through mergers may induce subsequent rival 
mergers.  
 
Using an algorithm based on dormant time periods between mergers within 
industries I identify sequential and non-sequential (stand alone) horizontal mergers. 
Controlling for the type of competition in the product markets, I find evidence that is 
partially consistent with the accommodation hypothesis. The hypotheses and the 
summary of findings in this study are presented in Table 13. As noted in the table, I find 
that the likelihood of sequential horizontal mergers is inversely related to the externality 
imposed on rival firms by an initial merger. I do not find evidence consistent with the 
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predictions of Yan (2006), Carow, Heron and Saxton (2006) and others who find that 
early movers in merger waves are better off than late movers. The wealth effects for 
acquiring firms measured as their announcement period abnormal returns are not 
different between first and second stage acquisitions. Further expected differences in the 
announcement period returns to first and second stage acquirers in strategic complements 
versus strategic substitutes and in mergers with positive versus negative externalities are 
not empirically supported. These results for acquirer returns are not affected in 
multivariate settings and hence I conclude that overall the evidence is only partially 
consistent with the predictions of strategic competition theory. 
 
The benefits of a large sample approach such as the one used in this study to 
analyze merger behavior across a panel of industries that represent different kind of 
product markets suffers from shortcomings in certain aspects of the research design. 
Firstly, measuring the extent of strategic interactions using any of the available proxies 
could be biased if the definition of an industry does not capture all the relevant market 
participants. In this study an industry is defined on the basis of the primary 4-digit SIC 
code that is reported on COMPUSTAT. In addition to the fact that the effect of private 
firm participants in the industry is overlooked, the  classification of industries to identify 
horizontal mergers does not map one on one to the same 4-digit SIC code as reported on 
the CRSP database. Kahle and Walkling (1996) find substantial disagreement between 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP in identifying horizontal mergers. Recent studies on Merger 
waves rely on the Fama-French industry classification, which is based on 2-digit level 
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SIC codes to identify horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. While this classification 
mitigates some of the known issues in the 4-digit SIC classification it is still plagued by 
the problem faced in this study. The 2-digit codes must be obtained either through 
COMPUSTAT or the CRSP databases. The extent of disagreement between CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT at the two digit level is unknown but based on Kahle and Walkling’s 
(1996) findings the Fama-French classification is probably as effective as the 4-digit 
classification used in this study. 
 
A second limitation is related to the algorithm used to identify sequential and 
stand alone mergers in this study. There is no theoretical basis for the choice of dormant 
periods or duration of the first and the second stage mergers. The threshold values are 
based on stylized empirical findings in the literature. If actual firm behavior is not 
consistent with these approximations then I could have misclassified the mergers. The 
definition of a sequential merger event irregardless of merger intensities may 
overestimate the frequency of these events. Additionally a large number of mergers were 
eliminated from my initial bid sample (roughly 37%) due to the frequency of stand alone 
mergers that occurred before the next initial bid in the industry and the lack of sufficient 
historical data for younger firms. The impact of these lost observations may have 
significantly compromised the strength of the results in this study.  
 
A third limitation is in regards to the competitive interaction measures used in this 
study. While Sundaram, John and John’s (1996) Competitive Strategy Measure and 
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Lyandres’s (2006) adjusted Competitive Strategy Measure are a definite improvement 
over a simple market share concentration index these measures are still imperfect. 
Sundaram et al’s measure suffers from a mis-classification problem while Lyandres’s 
measure does not allow for time variance in the nature of competition within an industry.  
 
 While the results in contained in this study provide weak support for strategic 
behavior in merger decisions, it does provide a new perspective to evaluating the 
profitability and welfare aspects in mergers. As direction for future research a case study 
type approach, where one can control for appropriate industry classification and the type 
of competition prevailing in the product market, may result in more robust results and 
fruitful insights. Further more identifying and studying industries that are more likely to 
display oligopolistic type behavior may enhance the empirical results found in this study. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of Horizontal Mergers in 4-Digit SIC Industries between 1980-2004 
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Figure 2 Identification of Sequential Horizontal Merger Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t = 120 
End of First Stage 
t = 720 
End of Second Stage 
Mergers beyond t 
= 720 calendar 
days excluded 
from sample 
t = 0 
Initial Bid 
Dormant time period 
of 360 calendar days 
with no bids in the 
industry 
 85 
TABLES 
Table 1 Reaction of Rival firms to an Initial Merger 
If an initial merger imposes positive externalities on rival firms then the optimal reaction of rival firms should be to maintain the 
status quo and not pursue their own mergers. However negative externalities may signal a competitive disadvantage and induce 
subsequent rival mergers. The ‘Market power’ and the ‘Productive efficiency’ hypotheses are generally offered to explain the gains 
to merging firms and their rivals in horizontal mergers. Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) postulate that while the market power 
hypothesis predicts positive externality on rival firms, the effect of efficiency motivated mergers is ambiguous. 
 
 
 
 Effect on Rival Firms Reaction of Rival Firms 
Market Power 
Hypothesis 
Positive 
(Increase in Monopoly Rents) 
Accommodation 
Merger encourages industry wide 
collusion or dominant firm pricing  
Productive Efficiency 
Hypothesis 
Negative 
(Competitive Disadvantage) 
Rival Merger 
Merger may encourage rivals to 
pursue their own mergers in order 
to remain competitive 
 Positive 
(Prospective Target/Opportunities for 
productivity increases) 
Rival Merger 
Merger may encourage rivals to 
pursue their own mergers in order 
to benefit from productivity 
increases 
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Table 2 Distribution of Acquisitions and Initial Bidders across sample period 
Panel A of this table presents the distribution of acquisition bids, the number of initial bids and the number of unique 4-digit SIC industries represented in the 
sample across the sample period. Panel  B presents the top 6 industries and number of acquisition bids and initial bidders in those industries. 
 
Panel A          
Year N % of total # of Initial Bidders # of Unique 4-Digit SIC Industry  
1981 5 0.63% 0 2  
1982 4 0.51% 1 1  
1983 4 0.51% 0 1  
1984 10 1.26% 0 2  
1985 15 1.89% 2 2  
1986 15 1.89% 3 3  
1987 14 1.77% 6 1  
1988 8 1.01% 3 2  
1989 11 1.39% 3 2  
1990 9 1.14% 2 2  
1991 8 1.01% 4 1  
1992 13 1.64% 6 2  
1993 18 2.27% 6 4  
1994 36 4.55% 7 4  
1995 43 5.43% 11 4  
1996 59 7.45% 12 5  
1997 87 10.98% 19 7  
1998 102 12.88% 22 7  
1999 88 11.11% 17 7  
2000 78 9.85% 21 6  
2001 55 6.94% 16 6  
2002 31 3.91% 5 5  
2003 38 4.80% 14 4  
2004 41 5.18% 15 5  
Total 792 100%  195 85  
     
 
Panel B           
Industry Name 4-Digit SIC # of Acquisitions % of Total # of Initial Bidders % of Total 
Prepackaged Software 7372 111 14.02% 4 2.05% 
Oil and Gas 1311 46 5.81% 6 3.08% 
Pharmaceuticals 2834 37 4.67% 3 1.54% 
Telecommunications 4813 29 3.66% 5 2.56% 
Computer Programming 7370 27 3.41% 0 0.00% 
Semiconductor 3674 21 2.65% 4 2.05% 
Total   271 34.22% 22 11.28% 
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Table 3 Distribution of Initial Bids and Merger Characteristics 1980-2004 
hhi is a sales based Herfindahl index measured prior to an initial bid in an industry. nofm1 and nofm2 are the number of mergers in the first stage and second stage respectively. 
dormant is the difference, in calendar days, between the announcement date of an initial bid and the earliest merger prior to that.. Timecomp is the difference, in calendar days, 
between the merger announcement date and the merger completion date. csm_dum is a dummy variable identifying industries that compete in strategic substitutes (csm<0) and 
complements (csm>0) based on the csm measure of Sundaram et al (1996). cluster1 (cluster2) is a measure of merger intensity defined as the ratio of nofm1 (nofm2) and the total 
number of acquisitions in a 4 –digit SIC industry across the entire sample period.  
 
4-Digit 
SIC Industry Name Year csm_dum nofm1 nofm2 dormant timecomp hhi cluster1 cluster2 
2082 MALT BEVERAGES 1982 0 1 0 457 133 0.2719 0.3333 0.0000 
2621 PAPER MILLS 1985 1 1 0 504 318 0.0847 0.2000 0.0000 
3841 SURGICAL,MED INSTR,APPARATUS 1985 1 1 0 1400 157 0.2858 0.0909 0.0000 
5311 DEPARTMENT STORES 1986 1 1 0 1771 105 0.1880 0.1111 0.0000 
5411 GROCERY STORES 1986 0 1 0 720 118 0.0712 0.0714 0.0000 
2834 PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 1987 1 1 0 660 723 0.0532 0.0270 0.0000 
3944 GAMES,TOYS,CHLD VEH,EX DOLLS 1987 1 1 0 1218 42 0.2901 0.2500 0.0000 
5411 GROCERY STORES 1987 0 1 2 511  0.0672 0.0714 0.1429 
3630 HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES 1988 1 1 0 945 94 0.2947 0.3333 0.0000 
7990 MISC AMUSEMENT & REC SERVICE 1988 1 1 0 882 273 0.0819 0.0588 0.0000 
2834 PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 1989 0 1 0 582 69 0.0548 0.0270 0.0000 
2844 PERFUME,COSMETIC,TOILET PREP 1989 0 1 0 1041 119 0.2030 0.5000 0.0000 
4813 PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 1989 0 1 3 2141 264 0.0565 0.0345 0.1034 
5331 VARIETY STORES 1990 1 1 0 2031 88 0.2030 0.2000 0.0000 
3944 GAMES,TOYS,CHLD VEH,EX DOLLS 1991 1 1 0 1245 183 0.1867 0.2500 0.0000 
4512 AIR TRANSPORT, SCHEDULED 1991 0 1 0 1673 129 0.0604 0.0833 0.0000 
7812 MOTION PIC, VIDEOTAPE PRODTN 1991 1 1 0 1334 32 0.2869 0.2500 0.0000 
4011 RAILROADS,LINE-HAUL OPERATNG 1992 0 1 0 1333 262 0.0694 0.1667 0.0000 
4813 PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 1992 1 2 1 435 286 0.0562 0.0690 0.0345 
5122 DRUGS AND PROPRIETARY-WHSL 1992 0 1 0 2853 153 0.2087 0.1667 0.0000 
1311 CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 1993 1 1 4 555 28 0.1461 0.0217 0.0870 
2211 BRDWOVEN FABRIC MILL, COTTON 1993 1 1 0 2863 111 0.1286 0.5000 0.0000 
3312 STEEL WORKS & BLAST FURNACES 1993 1 1 1 535 243 0.0695 0.1250 0.1250 
7372 PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE 1993 0 2 6 364 91 0.0405 0.0180 0.0541 
4011 RAILROADS,LINE-HAUL OPERATNG 1994 0 1 0 646 450 0.0691 0.1667 0.0000 
4813 PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 1994 0 1 2 514 220 0.0601 0.0345 0.0690 
5065 ELECTRONIC PARTS,EQ-WHSL,NEC 1994 0 1 0 519 68 0.1448 0.1667 0.0000 
2621 PAPER MILLS 1995 1 1 0 3500 148 0.0775 0.2000 0.0000 
3572 COMPUTER STORAGE DEVICES 1995 0 1 0 1063 138 0.1263 0.2000 0.0000 
3576 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP 1995 0 2 5 387 78 0.0675 0.1333 0.3333 
3674 SEMICONDUCTOR,RELATED DEVICE 1995 0 1 0 3095 89 0.1331 0.0476 0.0000 
3812 SRCH,DET,NAV,GUID,AERO SYS 1995 0 1 1 2708 35 0.1788 0.2500 0.2500 
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4-Digit 
SIC Industry Name Year csm_dum nofm1 nofm2 dormant timecomp hhi cluster1 cluster2 
3825 ELEC MEAS & TEST INSTRUMENTS 1995 0 1 0 2934 86 0.1305 0.1429 0.0000 
4011 RAILROADS,LINE-HAUL OPERATNG 1995 0 1 0 399 406 0.0709 0.1667 0.0000 
4833 TELEVISION BROADCAST STATION 1995 0 2 0 1180 193 0.1305 0.5000 0.0000 
5311 DEPARTMENT STORES 1995 0 2 1 3342 58 0.2186 0.2222 0.1111 
1381 DRILLING OIL AND GAS WELLS 1996 0 1 0 591 139 0.0548 0.1111 0.0000 
3320 IRON AND STEEL FOUNDRIES 1996 0 1 0 5239 45 0.2050 0.5000 0.0000 
3571 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS 1996 0 1 0 2762 129 0.2465 0.2000 0.0000 
4832 RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS 1996 1 3 2 377 218 0.0955 0.3333 0.2222 
8062 GEN MED & SURGICAL HOSPITALS 1996 1 1 0 743 105 0.4235 0.1000 0.0000 
1311 CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GS 1997 0 6 6 705 123 0.1276 0.1304 0.1304 
2060 SUGAR & CONFECTIONERY PRODS 1997 0 1 0 5450 118 0.2944 0.5000 0.0000 
2621 PAPER MILLS 1997 1 2 0 658 100 0.0944 0.4000 0.0000 
3312 STEEL WORKS & BLAST FURNACES 1997 1 2 2 541 147 0.0641 0.2500 0.2500 
3661 TELE & TELEGRAPH APPARATUS 1997 0 1 3 1298 146 0.3302 0.0714 0.2143 
3674 SEMICONDUCTOR,RELATED DEVICE 1997 0 2 1 647 112 0.1346 0.0952 0.0476 
3714 MOTOR VEHICLE PART,ACCESSORY 1997 1 1 3 392 34 0.0624 0.0909 0.2727 
3826 LAB ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS 1997 0 1 0 1784 151 0.1337 0.2500 0.0000 
5065 ELECTRONIC PARTS,EQ-WHSL,NEC 1997 1 1 0 1094 119 0.1798 0.1667 0.0000 
5311 DEPARTMENT STORES 1997 0 1 2 572 93 0.1722 0.1111 0.2222 
5331 VARIETY STORES 1997 1 1 0 2556 72 0.3572 0.2000 0.0000 
1040 GOLD AND SILVER ORES 1998 1 1 1 431 113 0.0741 0.1667 0.1667 
2451 MOBILE HOMES 1998 0 1 0 510 85 0.2041 0.5000 0.0000 
2750 COMMERCIAL PRINTING 1998 0 1 0 1177 40 0.1485 0.3333 0.0000 
3089 PLASTICS PRODUCTS, NEC 1998 1 1 0 2998 154 0.0990 0.5000 0.0000 
3576 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP 1998 1 1 0 448 95 0.1417 0.0667 0.0000 
3663 RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ 1998 1 1 3 659 77 0.2467 0.1429 0.4286 
3845 ELECTROMEDICAL APPARATUS 1998 1 3 0 518 93 0.1026 0.3333 0.0000 
3944 GAMES,TOYS,CHLD VEH,EX DOLLS 1998 1 1 0 2794 97 0.6054 0.2500 0.0000 
4512 AIR TRANSPORT, SCHEDULED 1998 0 1 2 414 286 0.0692 0.0833 0.1667 
4812 RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 1998 0 1 4 529 107 0.0568 0.0714 0.2857 
5065 ELECTRONIC PARTS,EQ-WHSL,NEC 1998 0 1 1 377 98 0.2027 0.1667 0.1667 
5331 VARIETY STORES 1998 0 1 1 372 130 0.3707 0.2000 0.2000 
5812 EATING PLACES 1998 1 1 0 920 67 0.0747 0.1250 0.0000 
7200 PERSONAL SERVICES 1998 0 1 0 755 166 0.1265 0.5000 0.0000 
3674 SEMICONDUCTOR,RELATED DEVICE 1999 0 2 7 367 159 0.0999 0.0952 0.3333 
4832 RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS 1999 0 1 0 362 331 0.1503 0.1111 0.0000 
4841 CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS 1999 1 2 1 1438 210 0.1221 0.4000 0.2000 
5122 DRUGS AND PROPRIETARY-WHSL 1999 0 1 0 2379 105 0.2033 0.1667 0.0000 
7011 HOTELS,MOTELS,TOURIST COURTS 1999 0 1 0 644 85 0.1551 0.1250 0.0000 
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4-Digit 
SIC Industry Name Year csm_dum nofm1 nofm2 dormant timecomp hhi cluster1 cluster2 
7311 ADVERTISING AGENCIES 1999 0 1 2 3847 115 0.1283 0.2000 0.4000 
8711 ENGINEERING SERVICES 1999 0 1 0 1248 50 0.0759 0.5000 0.0000 
1040 GOLD AND SILVER ORES 2000 0 1 0 556 204 0.0993 0.1667 0.0000 
1531 OPERATIVE BUILDERS 2000 1 1 4 790 75 0.0686 0.1429 0.5714 
2330 WOMENS,MISSES,JRS OUTERWEAR 2000 0 2 0 1322 344 0.2044 0.6667 0.0000 
2711 NEWSPAPER:PUBG, PUBG & PRINT 2000 1 2 0 2468 91 0.0797 0.6667 0.0000 
2851 PAINTS, VARNISHES, LACQUERS 2000 0 1 0 1575 177 0.2601 0.3333 0.0000 
2860 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIC CHEMICALS 2000 0 1 0 830 45 0.1061 0.5000 0.0000 
2911 PETROLEUM REFINING 2000 1 2 3 564 358 0.0642 0.1818 0.2727 
3411 METAL CANS 2000 0 1 0 2663 119 0.2300 0.3333 0.0000 
3523 FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 2000 0 1 0 553 147 0.2103 0.5000 0.0000 
3559 SPECIAL INDUSTRY MACHY, NEC 2000 0 2 3 418 77 0.1162 0.2000 0.3000 
3663 RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ 2000 1 1 0 394 46 0.1809 0.1429 0.0000 
3845 ELECTROMEDICAL APPARATUS 2000 1 1 0 712 134 0.2106 0.1111 0.0000 
4213 TRUCKING, EXCEPT LOCAL 2000 1 1 0 925 200 0.0565 0.3333 0.0000 
7812 MOTION PIC, VIDEOTAPE PRODTN 2000 0 1 0 3202 368 0.3051 0.2500 0.0000 
1040 GOLD AND SILVER ORES 2001 0 1 0 369 172 0.0976 0.1667 0.0000 
1381 DRILLING OIL AND GAS WELLS 2001 0 2 0 840 92 0.0637 0.2222 0.0000 
2836 BIOLOGICAL PDS,EX DIAGNSTICS 2001 0 2 0 413 43 0.1161 0.2500 0.0000 
3825 ELEC MEAS & TEST INSTRUMENTS 2001 1 2 1 2079 77 0.2404 0.2857 0.1429 
3826 LAB ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS 2001 0 1 0 1421 120 0.0820 0.2500 0.0000 
3841 SURGICAL,MED INSTR,APPARATUS 2001 1 1 0 669 66 0.1978 0.0909 0.0000 
5065 ELECTRONIC PARTS,EQ-WHSL,NEC 2001 1 1 0 633 78 0.1911 0.1667 0.0000 
5812 EATING PLACES 2001 1 1 0 419 102 0.0610 0.1250 0.0000 
7373 CMP INTEGRATED SYS DESIGN 2001 1 2 0 1155 69 0.2585 0.2500 0.0000 
8071 MEDICAL LABORATORIES 2001 1 1 3 2612 134 0.2408 0.2000 0.6000 
3350 ROLLING & DRAW NONFER METAL 2002 1 1 0 2088 142 0.2331 0.5000 0.0000 
3845 ELECTROMEDICAL APPARATUS 2002 0 1 0 535 107 0.2431 0.1111 0.0000 
5122 DRUGS AND PROPRIETARY-WHSL 2002 0 1 0 455 201 0.3218 0.1667 0.0000 
7990 MISC AMUSEMENT & REC SERVICE 2002 0 1 0 897 208 0.0577 0.0588 0.0000 
1381 DRILLING OIL AND GAS WELLS 2003 0 1 0 734 261 0.0873 0.1111 0.0000 
3576 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP 2003 0 1 1 882 28 0.5316 0.0667 0.0667 
3577 COMPUTER PERIPHERAL EQ, NEC 2003 0 1 0 1443 147 0.3136 0.5000 0.0000 
3812 SRCH,DET,NAV,GUID,AERO SYS 2003 0 1 0 2874 81 0.3820 0.2500 0.0000 
3845 ELECTROMEDICAL APPARATUS 2003 1 1 1 591 81 0.2529 0.1111 0.1111 
5311 DEPARTMENT STORES 2003 1 1 0 1852 90 0.1898 0.1111 0.0000 
7363 HELP SUPPLY SERVICES 2003 1 1 0 1567 188 0.1837 0.1667 0.0000 
3357 DRAWNG,INSULATNG NONFER WIRE 2004 1 1 0 3884 162 0.1376 0.5000 0.0000 
3533 OIL & GAS FIELD MACHY, EQUIP 2004 0 1 0 1610 211 0.1333 0.5000 0.0000 
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4-Digit 
SIC Industry Name Year csm_dum nofm1 nofm2 dormant timecomp hhi cluster1 cluster2 
3661 TELE & TELEGRAPH APPARATUS 2004 0 1 0 822 194 0.2004 0.0714 0.0000 
3825 ELEC MEAS & TEST INSTRUMENTS 2004 1 1 1 679 95 0.2093 0.1429 0.1429 
3842 ORTHO,PROSTH,SURG APPL,SUPLY 2004 1 1 0 1680 102 0.0808 0.2500 0.0000 
4812 RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 2004 0 1 0 1164 240 0.0751 0.0714 0.0000 
5912 DRUG & PROPRIETARY STORES 2004 0 1 0 2282 430 0.1818 0.1111 0.0000 
7310 ADVERTISING 2004 1 1 0 5725 121 0.1596 0.5000 0.0000 
7311 ADVERTISING AGENCIES 2004 1 1 0 1274 175 0.1998 0.2000 0.0000 
7359 EQUIP RENTAL & LEASING, NEC 2004 1 1 0 1981 100 0.1181 0.5000 0.0000 
7373 CMP INTEGRATED SYS DESIGN 2004 0 1 0 836 137 0.2897 0.1250 0.0000 
7841 VIDEO TAPE RENTAL 2004 1 1 0 6055 159 0.5233 0.5000 0.0000 
7990 MISC AMUSEMENT & REC SERVICE 2004 0 2 1 667 325 0.0595 0.1176 0.0588 
 SUM   149 85      
 MIN   1 0 362 28 0.0405 0.0180 0.0000 
 MAX   6 7 6055 723 0.6054 0.6667 0.6000 
 MEDIAN   1 0 882 119 0.1376 0.1667 0.0000 
  MEAN     1.2314 0.7025 1380.95 148.5583 0.1670 0.2233 0.0602 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics of Sequential Merger Determinants, Zit 
Variables 
All independent variables except c&i_spread are measured prior to the occurrence of an initial bid in the 
industry. Demand Shock is the industry median percentage change in sales. Demand_Shock _Sq is the 
square of Demand Shock. mb and mb_sd are the industry median Market to Book ratio and the standard 
deviation of Market to Book ratios within the industry. c&i_spread is the spread between the Commercial 
and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. Rivalret value weighted announcement abnormal return to a 
portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry .csm is the Sundaram et al (1996) csm 
competition measure. indavgcsm is the average csm across all firms in an industry year. M2 is an indicator 
variable for the occurrence of a sequential merger. Cluster1 (Cluster2) is a measure of merger intensity defined as 
the ratio of nofm1 (nofm2) and the total number of acquisitions in a 4 –digit SIC industry across the entire sample 
period. nofacqs is the total number of acquisitions in an industry across the entire sample period.  
 
 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A  
Industry Structure Variables           
csm 121 -0.0282 0.3031 -0.8259 0.7393 
indavgcsm 121 -0.0239 0.1306 -0.3019 0.3930 
hhi 121 0.1670 0.1065 0.0405 0.6054 
lognumfirms 121 4.4641 0.8683 2.6391 6.8469 
 
     
Panel B 
Industry Merger Characteristics      
m2 121 0.2893 0.4553 0 1 
cluster1 121 0.2233 0.1554 0.0180 0.6667 
cluster2 121 0.0602 0.1198 0 0.6 
Rivalret 121 0.0055 0.0266 -0.0534 0.1408 
nofacqs 121 9.6942 12.4217 2 111 
      
Panel C  
 Zit Variables      
Demand Shock 121 0.0991 0.1061 -0.1650 0.4676 
Demand_Shock _Sq 121 0.0210 0.0315 0.0000 0.2186 
lpm_medabs~g 121 0.0774 0.1280 0.0022 1.2429 
mb 121 2.4010 3.1446 0.5996 31.6708 
mb_sd 121 17.0379 63.4754 0.1679 490.3105 
c&i_spread 121 1.5791 0.2818 0.8050 2.5150 
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Table 5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients amongst the determinants of Sequential Mergers 
All independent variables except c&i_spread are measured prior to the occurrence of an initial bid in the industry. Demand Shock is the industry median percentage change in 
sales. Demand_Shock _Sq is the square of Demand Shock. mb and mb_sd are the industry median Market to Book ratio and the standard deviation of Market to Book ratios 
within the industry. C&i_spread is the spread between the Commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. Rivalret value weighted announcement abnormal return 
to a portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry .csm is the Sundaram et al (1996) csm competition measure. indavgcsm is the average CSM across all 
firms in an industry year. cluster1 (cluster2) is a measure of merger intensity defined as the ratio of nofm1 (nofm2) and the total number of acquisitions in a 4 –digit SIC industry across the 
entire sample period. m2 is an indicator variable for the occurrence of a sequential merger. nofacqs is the total number of acquisitions in an industry across the entire sample 
period.  
 
 
  m2 csm indav~sm hhi lognumfirms cluster1 cluster2 nofacqs  
Demand 
Shock ld12gr~2 lpm_me~g mb mb_sd ci_sr~d 
m2 1              
csm -0.0061 1             
indavgcsm 0.1879* 0.1569* 1            
hhi -0.2204* -0.0138 -0.2216* 1           
lognumfirms 0.4079* -0.0966 0.3369* -0.3203* 1          
cluster1 -0.4583* 0.1364* -0.1202 0.2000* -0.5976* 1         
cluster2 0.7059* 0.1657* 0.0308 -0.1271 0.0439 -0.2246* 1        
nofacqs 0.3623* -0.1750* 0.4169* -0.3028* 0.7404* -0.4747* -0.0566 1       
Demand Shock 0.2084* -0.0406 0.0255 -0.1810* 0.123 -0.0847 0.2990* 0.1406* 1      
Demand_Shock 
_Sq 0.1967* 0.0043 0.0264 -0.1752* 0.0333 -0.0202 0.2587* 0.0619 0.8766* 1     
lpm_medabs~g -0.0554 -0.0127 0.1596* 0.0168 0.3043* -0.0455 -0.111 0.0724 -0.0605 -0.0286 1    
mb 0.0612 -0.1101 0.0848 -0.002 0.1523* -0.0433 0.1524* 0.0139 0.1981* 0.1427* 0.2610* 1   
mb_sd -0.0289 -0.1521* -0.023 0.1379* 0.0442 0.0648 -0.0113 -0.066 -0.1547* -0.071 0.1804* 0.0533 1  
c&i_spread -0.1702* -0.018 -0.0944 0.1604* -0.1686* 0.1547* -0.0293 -0.1905* -0.1300* -0.0005 0.1104 0.0895 0.2425* 1 
* indicates significance at the 5% level at least 
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Table 6 Regressions predicting the likelihood of a sequential merger in 
an industry 
In columns 1,2 and 3 the dependent variable is m2, an indicator variable for the occurrence of a sequential 
merger. In column 4 the dependent variable, cluster2_dum is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 when 
the number of mergers in the second stage is greater than the average number of acquisitions in the industry 
across the entire sample period and 0 otherwise. In column 5 the dependent variable,cluster2, is the merger 
intensity calculated as nofm1 divided by nofacqs and is truncated below at 0. The estimation model in 
column 5 is a Tobit regression.  All independent variables except c&i_spread are measured prior to the 
occurrence of an initial bid in the industry. Demand Shock is the industry median percentage change in 
sales. Demand_Shock _Sq is the square of Demand Shock. mb and mb_sd are the industry median Market to 
Book ratio and the standard deviation of  Market to Book ratios within the industry. c&i_spread is the 
spread between the Commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. Rivalposret_dummy is 
dummy variable equal to 1 when then value weighted announcement return to a portfolio of rival firms at 
the time of the initial bid in the industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. csm is the Sundaram, John and 
John (1996) competition measure. Rivalret*csm is the interaction between rival return dummy and the 
competition measure.  
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
m1 m1 m1 cluster2_dum cluster2  
Rivalposret_dummy -0.8469* -0.8614* -0.8604* -1.0519* -0.1143$ 
 
(0.0470) (0.0440) (0.0450) (0.0220) (0.1030) 
csm  0.5127 0.5819 0.7740 0.1560 
 
 (0.4660) (0.4200) (0.3110) (0.1800) 
Rivalret*csm   -19.7799 -17.8503 -3.588 
 
  (0.5430) (0.6260) (0.4980) 
Demand Shock 1.1770 1.4750 1.5471 2.9883 0.5707 
 
(0.7370) (0.6750) (0.6630) (0.4670) (0.3540) 
Demand_Shock _Sq 3.0749 2.4744 2.2755 0.1218 -0.0762 
 
(0.7740) (0.8180) (0.8330) (0.9920) (0.9670) 
lpm_medabs~g -0.0675 -0.1844 -0.2231 -0.5804 -0.1903 
 
(0.9720) (0.9260) (0.9120) (0.7910) (0.6110) 
mb -0.0672 -0.0664 -0.0734 -0.0193 -0.0027 
 
(0.5720) (0.5820) (0.5400) (0.8410) (0.8380) 
mb_sd 0.0024 0.0029 0.0028 0.0013 0.0006 
 
(0.4660) (0.3920) (0.4030) (0.7540) (0.3060) 
c&i_spread -1.3449$ -1.3320 -1.3066 -1.7470* -0.1940 
 
(0.1090) (0.1120) (0.1190) (0.0540) (0.1580) 
_cons 1.5854 1.5640 1.5445 1.9094 0.1687 
 
(0.2500) (0.2550) (0.2620) (0.1940) (0.4450) 
 
     
N 121 121 121 121 121 
LR chi2 7.89 8.43 8.81 12.04 9.45 
Prob > chi2 0.342 0.3929 0.455 0.2112 0.397 
Pseudo R2 0.0542 0.0579 0.0605 0.0888 0.0941 
$,*,** indicates significance at the 10%,5% and 1% respectively 
Two tail p-values reported in parentheses under the coefficients 
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Table 7 Logit regressions predicting sequential horizontal mergers in 
stratified samples based on market structure     
The binary dependent variable, m1 is equal to 1 when a sequential acquisition bid occurs in an industry and 
is equal to 0 otherwise. All independent variables except c&i_spread are measured prior to the occurrence 
of an initial bid in the industry. Demand Shock is the industry median percentage change in sales. 
Demand_Shock _Sq is the square of Demand Shock. mb and mb_sd are the industry median Market to Book 
ratio and the standard deviation of  Market to Book ratios within the industry. c&i_spread is the spread 
between the Commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. Rivalposret_dummy is dummy 
variable equal to 1 when then value weighted announcement return to a portfolio of rival firms at the time 
of the initial bid in the industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. Rivalret is the value weighted 
announcement returns to rival firms at the time of an initial bid. csm is the Sundaram, John and John (1996) 
competition measure. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 csm>0 csm<0 csm>0 csm<0 
     
Rivalposret_dummy -0.9211 -0.7997   
 
(0.1690) (0.1780)   
winar1   -26.8882$ -13.9004 
 
  (0.0820) (0.3360) 
Demand Shock 2.5844 -4.1043 2.4151 -3.9181 
 
(0.6160) (0.4820) (0.6480) (0.5050) 
Demand_Shock _Sq 5.8444 10.1958 8.5460 10.8498 
 
(0.7380) (0.5420) (0.6260) (0.5250) 
lpm_medabs~g 5.3845 -0.8480 6.4218 -0.7032 
 
(0.3010) (0.7370) (0.2370) (0.7830) 
mb -0.1892 0.0071 -0.1937 0.0132 
 
(0.4210) (0.9440) (0.3990) (0.8940) 
mb_sd 0.0094 0.0017 0.0105 0.0021 
 
(0.4560) (0.6680) (0.4770) (0.6120) 
c&i_spread -0.2084 -3.3237* -0.3109 -3.2051* 
 
(0.8670) (0.0220) (0.8000) (0.0260) 
_cons -0.5455 4.8852* -0.9579 4.2618$ 
 
(0.7870) (0.0390) (0.6220) (0.0620) 
 
    
N 53 68 53 68 
LR chi2 6.54 8.6 8.34 7.72 
Prob > chi2 0.4785 0.2829 0.3033 0.3584 
Pseudo R2 0.1035 0.1043 0.1321 0.0936 
 
P-Values are  in parentheses below the coefficients 
$ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 Announcement Period Abnormal Returns to Acquirers and 
Rival Firms in Horizontal Mergers between years 1980-2004 
Columns 1 and 2 present the announcement returns to acquirers or rival firms over the (-1,1) and (-1,0) window 
respectively. Column 3 presents the number of firms in each event study sample. Column 4  contains the difference in 
mean test, p-values between the first and second stage acquirer abnormal return (-1,+1) in various sub samples. Panel A 
presents the announcement return to the acquirers in horizontal mergers and the initial bidders , panel B presents the 
announcement returns to first stage and second stage movers and their rival firms. Panels C and D presents the sample 
in Panel B sratified by whether they are strategic complements or substitutes. Panels E and F stratifies the sample in 
Panel B by the sign on rival_ret. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
 
(-1,1)  (-1,0)  n H0:M2-M1 <0 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A       
Horizontal Acquirers (2.18)**  (1.74%)**  234  
Initial Bidders (2.38)**  (1.36)**  121  
Rival Portfolio  0.62**  0.40**  121  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B          
M1Acquirers Only (2.10)**  (1.29)**  150  
M2 Acquirers Only (1.94)**  (2.30)**  84 P-Val=0.3049 
M1 Rivals 0.45**  0.46***  150  
M2 Rivals (0.04)*  (0.14)*  84 P-Val=0.0686 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C 
Strategic Complements   
 
  
 
  
 
All  Acquirers (1.91)**  (1.50)**  96  
M1 Acquirers Only (1.92)*  (1.08)**  65  
M2 Acquirers Only (1.89)**  (2.43)***  31 P-Val=0.4007 
M1 Rivals 0.61**  1.29**  65  
M2 Rivals (0.03)*  (0.11)$  31 P-Val=0.1353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D 
Strategic Substitutes   
 
  
 
  
 
All Acquirers (2.47)**  (1.49)**  138  
M1 Acquirers Only (2.24)**  (1.45)**  85  
M2 Acquirers Only (2.88)**  (1.70)**   53 P-Val=0.3363 
M1 Rivals 0.336*  0.18*  85  
M2 Rivals (0.04)**  (0.14)**  53 P-Val=0.1713 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel E 
Positive Externality  
 
 
 
 
 
All Acquirers (2.47)**  (1.91)**  122  
M1 (0.91)**  (0.88)**  85  
M2 (3.33)**  (3.08)**  37 P-Val=0.0985 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel F 
Negative Externality  
 
 
 
 
 
All Acquirers  (2.95)**  (2.00)**  112  
M1 (3.69)**  (1.84)**  65  
M2 (1.91)**  (2.25)**  47 P-Val=0.7240 
The symbols $,* and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively, using a 1-
tail t/Z test. 
 96 
Table 9 Summary Statistics for the determinants of Acquirer Returns, 
Xit Variables 
 Acq_ret1 and Acq_ret2,respectively, are the acquirer’s CAR over a (-1,1) and (-1,0) window surrounding 
the announcement date of the acquisition. . Rivalret is the value weighted announcement return to a 
portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry over (-1,1) window. csm is the 
competitive strategy measure of Sundaram et al (1996). ib_dum is a dummy identify if the acquirer was the 
first to make a bid in the industry. Stage is the number of days since an initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a 
dummy identifying if the acquirer belongs to the first stage decision maker group. amb is the acquirers 
equity market to book ratio. t_mb is the target’s equity market to book ratio. mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer 
and target MB ratio. tender_dum is a dummy if the acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. 
lognumfirms is log of the number of firms in the industry prior to the initial bid. dormant is the number 
days there were no mergers in the industry prior to the current merger. timecomp is the difference in days 
between the acquisition announcement date and the completion date. challenged is a dummy variable if 
SDC identifies the acquisition bid if the merger was challenged by the merger authorities. meth_pmt is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the acquisition was made with cash only and deal_val is the value of 
the deal as reported by SDC. 
 
 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A  
Measures of Acquirer and Rival 
Returns           
Acq_ret1 234 -0.0229 0.0812 -0.4856 0.2530 
Acq_ret2 234 -0.0182 0.0684 -0.3169 0.3983 
Rivalret 234 0.0028 0.0244 -0.0534 0.1408 
      
Panel B      
csm 234 -0.0250 0.3084 -0.8259 0.7393 
indavgcsm 234 -0.0014 0.1263 -0.3019 0.3930 
nofm1 234 1.6453 1.1893 1 6 
nofm2 234 1.9316 2.1953 0 7 
stage1 234 0.6410 0.4807 0 1 
      
Panel C 
Xit Variables      
stage 234 137.8932 197.5232 0 715 
ib_dum 234 0.5171 0.5008 0 1 
dormant 234 778.7735 1060.4540 0 6055 
timecomp 233 140.1760 95.5325 0 723 
amb 228 2.8549 3.5633 0.5996 32.3789 
tmb 226 2.0157 1.7778 0.5388 18.5757 
mb_rel 221 1.4806 1.1629 0.3038 12.0564 
tender_dum 234 0.2222 0.4166 0 1 
hhi 234 0.1452 0.0979 0.0405 0.6054 
lognumfirms 234 4.8042 0.9737 2.6391 6.8469 
Challenged 175 0.0628 .2434 0 1 
Deal_val 175 241.8250 274.7109 1 998.1620 
Meth_pmt 175 0.1885 0.3932 0 1 
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Table 10 Pearson Correlation Coefficients amongst the determinants of Acquirer’s announcement returns 
 Acq_ret1 is the acquirer’s CAR over a (-1,1) window surrounding the announcement date of the acquisition. . Rivalret is the value weighted announcement return to a portfolio of 
rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry over a (-1,1)) window. csm is the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram et al (1996). ib_dum is a dummy identify if the 
acquirer was the first to make a bid in the industry. Stage is the number of days since an initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a dummy identifying if the acquirer belongs to the first 
stage decision maker group. amb is the acquirers equity market to book ratio. T_mb is the target’s equity market to book ratio. Mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer and target MB ratio. 
tender_dum is a dummy if the acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. lognumfirms is log of the number of firms in the industry prior to the initial bid. dormant is 
the number days there were no mergers in the industry prior to the current merger. 
 
 
 carwin~1 winar1 csm indav~sm stage stage1 ib_dum dormant amb tmb mb_rel tender~m hhi Lg~frms 
carwindow1 1              
winar1 0.0593 1             
csm 0.024 0.0319 1            
indavgcsm -0.0895 0.0815 0.1569* 1           
nofm1 0.0251 -0.2039* -0.2062* 0.1355*           
nofm2 -0.0158 -0.2011* -0.1272 0.2792*           
stage -0.073 -0.0942 0.0585 0.1881* 1          
stage1 0.0335 0.0975 -0.0105 -0.1438* -0.8406* 1         
ib_dum 0.0111 0.1166 -0.0106 -0.1845* -0.7239* 0.7744* 1        
dormant 0.0462 0.1236 0.0192 -0.1716* -0.4097* 0.4363* 0.5889* 1       
amb -0.1057 0.041 -0.1098 0.0856 0.1572* -0.1464* -0.1369* -0.0701 1      
tmb -0.1301 -0.0036 -0.0756 0.1696* 0.2191* -0.2065* -0.2194* -0.1804* 0.5173* 1     
mb_rel -0.1663* 0.128 -0.1243 -0.0678 -0.0047 -0.001 0.0012 0.0499 0.6952* -0.1131 1    
tender_dum 0.1219 0.0263 -0.0006 -0.0599 -0.1504* 0.1214 0.1051 0.1298* -0.1051 -0.1237 -0.0068 1   
hhi -0.0909 0.0279 -0.0138 -0.2216* -0.2165* 0.1659* 0.2303* 0.3483* -0.0019 -0.0548 0.098 0.1712* 1  
lognumfirms -0.1294* -0.1900* -0.0966 0.3369* 0.3326* -0.2821* -0.3622* -0.4423* 0.1527* 0.2115* 0.0266 -0.1988* -0.3203* 1 
* indicates significance at the 5% level at least 
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Table 11 OLS Regressions of Acquirer’s announcement period 
abnormal returns 
 The dependent variable is the acquirer’s CAR over a three day window surrounding the announcement 
date of the acquisition. . Rivalposret_dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the value weighted 
abnormal announcement period return to a portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the 
industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. csm is the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John 
and John (1996). dormant is number of days an industry had no acquisitions. Stage is the number of days 
since an initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a dummy identifying if the acquirer belongs to the first stage 
decision maker group. mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer and target MB ratio. tender_dum is a dummy if the 
acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. hhi is the sales based Herfindahl index measuring 
industry concentration. log assets is the log of Firm Assets (Data6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   CSM>0 CSM<0 Rivalret>0 Rivalret<0 
       
dormant 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.2480)  (0.8930) (0.5030) (0.1900) (0.0160) 
ib_dum -0.0169 -0.0080 -0.0254 -0.0036 -0.0051 -0.0293 
 
(0.3710) (0.6430) (0.3960) (0.8840) (0.8380) (0.3000) 
stage1 0.0168 0.0159 0.0318 0.0077 0.0330 0.0083 
 
(0.3480) (0.3720) (0.2670) (0.7390) (0.1740) (0.7500) 
csm 0.0007 0.0017   -0.0068 0.0106 
 
(0.9670) (0.9230)   (0.7830) (0.6640) 
Rivalposret_dummy .01013 .0097 .0052 .01268   
 
(0.3620) (0.3810) (0.7790) (0.3880)   
amb -0.0045$ -0.0045$ -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0062$ 
 
(0.0810) (0.0790) (0.5210) (0.1180) (0.5100) (0.0730) 
mb_rel -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0218 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0183$ 
 
(0.6950) (0.7250) (0.2600) (0.9360) (0.9970) (0.1080) 
log assets 0.0037 0.0036 0.0046 0.0025 -0.0038 0.0053 
 
(0.2920) (0.3060) (0.3880) (0.6060) (0.4380) (0.3020) 
hhi -0.0887 -0.0709 0.0616 -0.1789* 0.0669 -0.2219* 
 
(0.1310) (0.2110) (0.5110) (0.0210) (0.3940) (0.0120) 
_cons -0.0380 -0.0386 -0.0353 -0.0246 -0.0085 -0.0099 
 
(0.217) (0.2100) (0.4880) (0.5490) (0.8380) (0.8410) 
 
      
Number of obs 221 221 91 130 118 103 
F 2.03 2.12 1.03 2.1 0.96 3.55 
Prob > F 0.037 0.0354 0.4205 0.0413 0.4735 0.0008 
R-squared 0.0802 0.0743 0.0913 0.1226 0.0744 0.2577 
Adj R-squared 0.0408 0.0392 0.0027 0.0641 -0.0027 0.1851 
F-test 
H0:Stage1*csm=0 
F-Value=0.15, 
P>F=0.7030      
F-test 
H0:Stage1*rivalret=0 
F-Value=0.69 
P>F=0.4055      
$,*,** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. P-Values are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. 
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Table 12 OLS Regressions of Acquirer’s abnormal returns controlling 
for merger-specific characteristics 
 The dependent variable is the acquirer’s CAR over a three day window surrounding the announcement date of the 
acquisition. . Rivalposret_dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the value weighted abnormal announcement 
period return to a portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. 
csm is the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John and John (1996). dormant is number of days an industry 
had no acquisitions. Stage is the number of days since an initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a dummy identifying if the 
acquirer belongs to the first stage decision maker group. mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer and target MB ratio. 
tender_dum is a dummy if the acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. hhi is the sales based Herfindahl 
index measuring industry concentration. log assets is the log of Firm Assets (Data6). challenged is a dummy variable if 
SDC identifies the acquisition bid if there were multiple bids. meth_pmt is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
acquisition was made with cash only and deal_val is the value of the deal as reported by SDC. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  CSM>0 CSM<0 Rivalret>0 Rivalret<0 
 
     
dormant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000$ 0.0000$ 
 
(0.5080) (0.2650) (0.7730) (0.0920) (0.0670) 
ib_dum -0.0326 -0.0658 -0.0290 -0.0140 -0.0401 
 
(0.1940) (0.1490) (0.3950) (0.6880) (0.2490) 
stage1 0.0218 0.0678 0.0199 0.0373 0.0070 
 
(0.3740) (0.1140) (0.5400) (0.2920) (0.8260) 
csm -0.0003   -0.0111 0.0216 
 
(0.9900)   (0.7370) (0.4560) 
Rivalposret_dummy  .01359 .0178   
 
 (0.575) (0.3400)   
cluster1 0.0324 -0.0600 0.0909 0.1122 -0.0089 
 
(0.5550) (0.5360) (0.2330) (0.1120) (0.9150) 
Demand Shock 0.0082 0.0154 -0.0436 -0.0652 0.1040 
 
(0.8980) (0.8810) (0.6140) (0.4930) (0.2320) 
lpm_medabs~g -0.0282 -0.2922 -0.0329 -0.1040 0.0231 
 
(0.6180) (0.1400) (0.6070) (0.5970) (0.6920) 
amb -0.0042 0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0001 -0.0077$ 
 
(0.2830) (0.9170) (0.3060) (0.9920) (0.0910) 
mb_rel -0.0101 -0.0411 -0.0031 0.0133 -0.0213 
 
(0.3450) (0.1180) (0.8110) (0.3870) (0.1350) 
log assets 0.0044 0.0045 0.0026 -0.0094 0.0062 
 
(0.3920) (0.5720) (0.7150) (0.2310) (0.3240) 
hhi -0.0879 0.0492 -0.2004* 0.1293 -0.2769** 
 
(0.2030) (0.6610) (0.0340) (0.1960) (0.0040) 
tender_dum 0.0224 0.0019 0.0421 -0.0175 0.0394$ 
 
(0.1990) (0.9410) (0.1110) (0.4690) (0.0870) 
challenged -0.0364 -0.0718* -0.0021 0.0117 -0.0985** 
 
(0.1850) (0.0380) (0.9700) (0.7400) (0.0150) 
meth_pmt 0.0054 0.0355 -0.0304 0.0156 -0.0104 
 
(0.7730) (0.2050) (0.2750) (0.5770) (0.6510) 
log_deal Value 0.0041 0.0066 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0032 
 
(0.2120) (0.2470) (0.5210) (0.9840) (0.4420) 
_cons -0.0504 -0.0314 -0.0208 0.0064 -0.0221 
 (0.3220) (0.6930) (0.7700) (0.9320) (0.7300) 
Number of obs 163 65 98 84 79 
F-Stat 1.12 1.28 0.95 0.85 3.14 
Prob > F 0.3449 0.2518 0.5057 0.6221 0.0007 
R-squared 0.1024 0.2641 0.1387 0.1576 0.4278 
Adj R-squared 0.0108 0.0581 -0.0066 -0.0282 0.2915 
$,*,** denote significance at the 10%,5% and 1% respectively. P-Values are reported in parentheses 
below  the coefficients 
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Table 13 Summary of Findings 
This table summarizes the empirical evidence in support for each of the hypotheses. The first column 
presents the statement of my hypotheses contained in Chapter 3. The second column presents a brief outline 
of the outcome of the empirical tests. 
Hypothesis Finding 
   
H1: If accommodation was 
intended then the likelihood of a 
sequential merger decision is 
negatively related to the 
externality imposed by early 
mergers on rival firms 
Externalities are negatively related to  the likelihood of a 
sequential mergers 
  
H2: The likelihood of a 
sequential merger decision is 
positively related to the 
interaction between the nature 
of competition and the 
externality imposed by early 
mergers on rival firms. 
 
There are no effects of strategic competition on the 
sequential merger outcome.  
  
H3: In Strategic Complements, 
the first stage acquirers are 
better off than the second stage 
acquirers. 
 
 I find no support in univariate tests that early movers fare 
better in strategic complements than the late movers. 
These effects fail to be significant in multivariate settings 
either.  
  
H4: In Strategic Substitutes, the 
first and second stage acquirers 
earn similar announcement 
period returns. 
 
I find evidence that early movers and late movers are 
equally worse of in strategic substitutes.  
  
H5: For mergers with a positive 
externality the announcement 
return to first stage acquirers 
are greater than that of the 
second stage acquirers. 
 
I find evidence consistent with this prediction in 
univariate tests and no supporting evidence in multivariate 
settings 
  
H6: For mergers with negative 
externality first and second 
stage acquirers earn similar 
announcement period returns. 
I find univariate support for this prediction but the result 
does not hold up in multivariate settings. 
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APPENDIX 
A1. Nilssen and Sorgard’s (1998) sequential horizontal merger theory 
The starting point of Nilssen and Sorgard’s (1998) model is the effect a merger 
has on the profits earned by non-merging firms in the same industry; this effect is 
positive if there is no cost saving to gain for the merging firms but may be negative for 
sufficiently large savings on variable costs following a merger. Suppose that two 
different mergers are about to form and that these formations take place in sequence. The 
firms involved in the first merger may want to encourage or discourage the second 
merger, depending on how the latter affects the profits of non-merging firms. In the 
model there are two disjoint sets of firms, the stage one decision makers, M1 and the 
stage two decision makers, M2. M2 observes the decision made by M1 and accordingly 
make their decision. M1 makes their merger decision after taking into account the 
expected reaction from M2 and the resulting impact on its own profitability. M1 makes 
its optimal choice depending on whether it wants M2 to merge or not28. This model yields 
four possible outcomes, numbered 1 through 4 as illustrated in Table A1.1. 
                                                 
28
 Nilssen and Sorgard’s (1998) two stage game does not have simultaneous moves in the second stage. In 
their second stage, M2 chooses between a high and a low activity level (merger or no merger). Since they 
use Fudenberg and Tirole’ (1985) original framework to illustrate the business strategies they say that M1 
plays soft(tough) when it wants M2 to play high (low) in stage 2, i.e., when it wants M2 to merge (not to 
merge) 
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Table A1.1 Four Possible outcomes in the Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) Model 
 
 
M2 M1 
 
Merge 
 
Don’t Merge 
 
Merge 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Don’t Merge 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
Each of the possible outcomes arises under circumstances that can be described 
under two scenarios. 1) In the first scenario it is profitable for M2 to merge following a 
merger by M1 (i.e. M1’s merger encourages M2’s merger). If M2’s subsequent merger 
has a positive impact on M1’s profitability then it is optimal for M1 to merge (Fat Cat 
Strategy) thereby encouraging M1’s merger which is profitable for all firms in the 
industry. However if M2’s subsequent merger has a negative impact on M1’s profitability 
then it is optimal for M1 not to merge (Lean and hungry look) to deter M2’s merger. 2) In 
the second scenario it is not profitable for M2 to merge following a merger by M1 (i.e. 
M1’s merger discourages M2’s merger). If M2’s stand alone merger has a positive impact 
on M1’s profitability then M1 should not merge (Puppy Dog ploy). But if M2’s stand 
alone merger has a negative impact on M1 then M1 should merge in order to soften M2’s 
reaction (Top Dog strategy).  These strategies are summarized in Figure A1.1 
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Figure A1.1 Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) Sequential Merger Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M1’s merger 
Discourages M2’s 
Merger 
  
Encourages M2’s 
Merger  
M2’s Stand alone 
Merger Increases 
M1’s Profit  
M2’s Stand alone 
Merger Decreases 
M1’s Profit 
NO 
(Puppy Dog Ploy) 
Yes 
(Top Dog Strategy) 
M2’s Merger after 
M1’s merger 
increases M1’s profit 
M2’s merger after 
M1’s merger 
decreases M1’s profit 
Yes 
(Fat Cat Strategy) 
No 
(Lean and Hungry 
Look) 
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A2.Alternative Measures of Competition 
A key to the analysis contained in my study lies in the measurement of 
competitive interactions in an industry. While the Herfindahl-type index is a popular 
measure market structure it is argued that the relationship between the Herfindahl index 
and competitive interaction is ambiguous. Lyandres (2006) proposes two alternative 
measures in his study to capture strategic interactions. His first measure is simply the log 
number of firms in the industry which as an inverse proxy for competitive interactions. 
While this measure does not directly capture whether a firm competes in strategic 
substitutes it is positively correlated with the absolute slope of firm reaction functions. 
His second measure is a modified version of the CSM estimated in Sundaram, John and 
John (1996). Sundaram et al’s measure can be biased if there are common cost or revenue 
shocks to firms in an industry. Lyandres (2006) corrects this problem in Sundaram et al’s 
CSM measure and estimates an Adjusted CSM measure, .CSM
 
 
{ }2,11 / SSCorrCSM ∆∆∆= ∏                (A2.1) 
I use this alternative measure of competitive interactions and re-run my models the 
results from which are presented in this section. 
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Table A2.1 Logit Regression predicting the probability of a sequential merger in an 
industry  
The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 when a sequential acquisition bid occurs in an industry and is 
equal to 0 otherwise. All independent variables except C&i_spread are measured prior to the occurrence of 
an initial bid in the industry. Demand Shock is the industry median percentage change in sales. 
Demand_Shock _Sq is the square of Demand Shock. Mb and mb_sd are the industry median Market to 
Book ratio and the standard deviation of  Market to Book ratios within the industry. C&i_spread is the 
spread between the Commercial and industrial loans and the federal funds rate. Rivalposret_dummy is 
dummy variable equal to 1 when then value weighted announcement return to a portfolio of rival firms at 
the time of the initial bid in the industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. Csm_l is the Lyandres (2006) 
adjusted CSM competition measure. Csml_Rivalret is the interaction between rival return dummy and the 
competition measure. Standard errors are reported in parantheses below the coefficients. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SS SC Low HHI High 
HHI 
Rivalposret_dummy -1.52** -1.03 -3.32** -1.85** -2.20 
 
(0.64) (.79) (1.44) (0.86) (1.38) 
csm_l -0.2705     
 
(0.88)     
csml_Rivalret 21.24     
 
(46.44)     
Demand Shock 3.87 3.54 -0.95 -3.89 38.66 
 
(6.30) (9.53) (12.59) (8.48) (43.30) 
Demand_Shock 
_Sq 
-1.65 -13.20 37.55 33.17 -169.9 
 
(19.25) (30.73) (37.79) (30.04) (217.3) 
Profitability Shock 12.71$ 7.21 34.02$ 8.00 23.87 
 
(7.07) (9.07) (20.61) (10.44) (15.38) 
mb -0.00 0.19 -0.40 -0.03 -0.10 
 
(0.25) (0.31) (0.87) (0.29) (0.59) 
mb_sd -0.05 -0.00 -0.21 -0.04 0.00 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.26) (0.07) (0.13) 
c&i_spread -2.20$ -3.03$ -2.53 -2.85$ -1.91 
 
(1.22) (1.74) (2.71) (1.63) (2.54) 
Constant 2.10 3.25 3.27 3.82 -0.13 
 
(1.94) (2.86) (4.41) (2.57) (4.44) 
Observations 78  42  36 42  36  
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
$ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table A2.2 OLS Regressions of Acquirer’s announcement period abnormal returns 
 The dependent variable is the acquirer’s CAR over a three day window surrounding the announcement 
date of the acquisition. . Rivalposret_dummy is dummy variable equal to 1 when then value weighted 
announcement return to a portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry is positive and 
equal to 0 otherwise. Csm_l is the adjusted competitive strategy measure of Lyandres (2006). 
Csml_Rivalret is the interaction between rival return and the competition measure. Ib_dum is a dummy 
identify if the acquirer was the first to make a bid in the industry. Stage is the number of days since an 
initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a dummy identifying if the acquirer belongs to the first stage decision 
maker group. Mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer and target MB ratio. Tender_dum is a dummy if the 
acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. Lognumfirms is log of the number of firms in the 
industry prior to the initial bid. Standard errors are reported in parantheses below the coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2)  
        
Rivalposret_dummy 0.0085 -0.0001   
  
(0.0126) (0.0137)   
csm_l 0.0317$ 0.0365$   
  
(0.0196) (0.0209)   
Csml_Rivalret 0.2912 0.3382   
  
 (0.7803) (0.8135)    
ib_dum  -0.0354  
 
 (0.0191)  
stage  -0.0000  
 
 (0.0000)  
stage1  0.0193  
 
 (0.0262)  
mb_rel  -0.0058  
 
 (0.0062)  
tender_dum  0.0222  
 
 (0.0156)  
lognumfirms  -0.0056  
 
 (0.0076)  
Constant -0.0235* 0.0236  
 
(0.0083) (0.0461)  
Observations 151 151  
R-squared  0.0975 0.0271    
Standard errors in parentheses 
$ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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A3. Alternative specification of the OLS regression models of acquirer returns 
 
I address two issues pertaining to the specification of the regression models in Tables 
11 and 12. Firstly, inclusion of initial bidders in the OLS regressions may bias the 
coefficients in the regression model because the announcement returns to the initial 
bidders and the rival portfolios are measured contemporaneously. Secondly, because 
hypotheses 3 through 6 imply differential effects of Stage1, between sub-groups based on 
the competitive measure and externality classification, the regression models in Tables 11 
and 12 do not directly test this relationship.  The principal variable of interest Stage1, 
which is a dummy variable, identifies first stage bidders.  In general this variable is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the acquirer returns. This positive 
relationship is expected to be primarily driven by acquirers in strategic complements (H3 
and H4) and those that experienced positive externalities (H5 and H6). In order to 
account for these problems in the original regression models, I run alternative 
specifications and report these results in Table A3.1.  
 
 
 I exclude the initial bidders from the sample of acquirers and run the OLS 
regression model specified in Equation 10. The results from this regression are reported 
in column (1) of Table A3.1. The estimates are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 11. Stage1 still enters the regression with an insignificant coefficient. The only 
variable of significance is the equity market to book ratio, amb, which as in Table 11 has 
a significantly negative impact on the acquirer’s returns. Based on these results I 
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conclude that including the initial bidders in the acquirer return regressions does not 
introduce any significant bias in the coefficient estimates. Thus my original 
interpretations of the estimates in Table 11 and 12 are unaltered.  
 
In columns (2) and (3) I report the regression estimates of all acquirers but in addition 
I include two interaction terms, Stage1 interacted with csm, stage1*csm and with the 
value weighted announcement returns to rival portfolios measured at the time of the 
corresponding initial bid, stage1*rivalret. These interaction terms are meant to capture 
any differential impact of stage1 across the sub-samples based on either the competitive 
strategy measure or the positive versus negative externality measure. The F-statistic 
generated by test, reported at the bottom of the table, fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that Stage1 has any differential impact on the acquirer returns across the sub-samples. 
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Table A3.1 OLS Regressions of Acquirer’s announcement period abnormal returns 
 The dependent variable is the acquirer’s CAR over a three day window surrounding the announcement date of the 
acquisition. . Rivalposret_dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the value weighted abnormal announcement 
period return to a portfolio of rival firms at the time of the initial bid in the industry is positive and equal to 0 otherwise. 
csm is the competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John and John (1996). dormant is number of days an industry 
had no acquisitions. Stage is the number of days since an initial bid in an industry. Stage1 is a dummy identifying if the 
acquirer belongs to the first stage decision maker group. mb_rel is ratio of the acquirer and target MB ratio. 
tender_dum is a dummy if the acquisition was conducted through a tender offer or not. hhi is the sales based Herfindahl 
index measuring industry concentration. Stage1*csm is an interaction term between stage1 and csm. Stage1*rivalret is 
an interaction term between stage1 and the value weighted abnormal announcement period return to a portfolio of rival 
firms at the time of the corresponding initial bid. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
       
dormant 0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  
 
(0.7170)  (0.2170)  (0.2660)  
ib_dum -  -0.0166  -0.0168  
 
  (0.3730)  (0.3650)  
stage1 0.0209  0.0187  0.0178  
 
(0.2840)  (0.2880)  (0.3120)  
csm -0.0189  -0.0269  -0.0025  
 
(0.4300)  (0.3290)  (0.8830)  
Rivalposret_dummy 0.0065  0.0118  0.0039  
 
(0.6620)  (0.2780)  (0.7670)  
amb -0.0061$  -0.0046$  -0.0048*  
 
(0.0460)  (0.0650)  (0.0560)  
mb_rel 0.0044  -0.0035  -0.0028  
 
(0.5490)  (0.5870)  (0.6680)  
hhi 0.0182  -0.0875  -0.0829  
 
(0.8390)  (0.1340)  (0.1570)  
Stage1*csm -  0.0392  -  
 
  (0.2640)    
Stage1*rivalret -  -  0.3153  
 
    (0.3070)  
_cons -0.0330  -0.0108  -0.0074  
 
(0.1720)  (0.4300)  (0.5980)  
 
      
Number of obs 121  221  221  
F 0.9700  1.86  1.83  
Prob > F 0.4555  0.0602  0.0643  
R-squared 0.0662  0.0733  0.0724  
Adj R-squared -0.0018  0.0338  0.0329  
F=1.26 F-test 
H0:Stage1*csm=0 -  P>F=0.2637  -  
F=1.05 F-test 
H0:Stage1*rivalret=0 -  -  P>F=0.3068  
$,*,** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. P-Values are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. 
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Findings and Conclusions:  Temporally separated merger decisions within an industry 
may not necessarily be independent events.  The literature on merger waves and casual 
observation attests to this fact. Fundamental economic shocks and cheaper capital are 
attributed as causes of this cascading effect in merger activity. See Harford (2004). 
Devoid of economic shocks will merger attempts by one firm encourage other firms to 
pursue similar strategies?  Further, do firms anticipate rival reactions in making their own 
merger decisions? The principal idea in this study is that in oligopolistic settings, given 
that a merger has occurred in an industry, the likelihood that the initial merger will be 
followed by a sequential merger is conditional on the nature of merger induced 
externalities and the expected reaction of rival firms. When merger induced externalities 
are positive, the likelihood of a sequential merger is lower. I refer to this expectation as 
the ‘Accommodation Hypothesis’.  
The findings in this study are partially consistent with the ‘Accommodation 
hypothesis’. Controlling for the type of competition in the product markets I find that the 
likelihood of sequential horizontal mergers is inversely related to the externality imposed 
on rival firms by an initial merger. I do not find evidence consistent with the stylized 
empirical results of Yan (2006), Carow, Heron and Saxton (2006) and others who find 
that early movers in merger waves are better off than late movers. The wealth effects for 
acquiring firms measured as their announcement period abnormal returns are not 
different between first and second stage acquisitions. These results for acquirer returns 
are not affected in multivariate settings and hence I conclude that overall the evidence is 
only partially consistent with strategic competition theory. 
